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Spinoza is the rationalist philosopher par excellence. Spinoza made every conceivable emancipatory claim for reason in delineating the connection of reason to freedom and power. Spinoza develops a philosophy which affirms the emancipatory function of reason. This kind of philosophy has been challenged in recent times by postmodernist modes of thought. Whereas Spinoza affirms knowledge as power in a positive sense, the likes of Michel Foucault argue a knowledge/power nexus that savours more of an Hobbesian ceaseless conflict. Foucault’s equation of all forms of knowledge with the endless exercise of a power, the effects of which may be discursively placed but whose authority cannot be subject to rational criticism, explicitly denies the emancipatory function that Spinoza assigned to reason. Free of such rational critique, discourse inspired by Foucault lacks political and ethical import. Not surprisingly, Foucault’s work has proved itself to be compatible with a wide range of political platforms, spanning the spectrum from New Left to New Right. This political ambivalence directly follows from the loss of an ethical position owing to the denial of rational critique. The distinguishing characteristic of ‘the Left’ in both politics and ethics has been the commitment not just to challenge existing power structures in favour of the poor, the marginalized and the suppressed but to associate this challenge with a commitment to distinguish truth from ideological mystification and obfuscation. In connecting his rational philosophy with democratic politics, Spinoza is a ‘Left’ thinker in this grand tradition. This thesis highlights the ‘radical’ aspects of Spinoza’s rationalist philosophy, finding inspiration in his God-Nature relation, his democratic politics and his commitment to free rational thinking as subversive of all forms of coercive or state-sanctioned religious doctrine. 

Philosophy can retain its emancipatory function and engage the political, social and  economic issues of the day by resisting the postmodernist drift which renounces the project of separating truth from illusion, reason from rhetoric. In delineating the terms of freedom, knowledge and power and in showing their connection to each other, Spinoza offers a means of resisting the relativising tendencies of contemporary theory and, indeed, the way that this relativism in ethics serves existing power and entrenches the forces of political conservatism. The truth, for Spinoza, is the product not of consensus-belief but of rational critique which subjects existing norms and values to question. Not the least of Spinoza’s achievements is to have shown how such rational critique – the very stuff of philosophy – is no longer an elitist concern leading to the philosopher-ruler but has the potential to emancipate all humankind, since knowledge is key to an active relation to the world.

This thesis will argue that any politics and theory which pursues emancipatory ends can learn a great deal from Spinoza. The most important aspect of Spinoza’s thought is the idea that the critical exercise of reason, in providing a more adequate conceptual grasp of experiences that would otherwise belong to the realm of pre-reflective ‘commonsense’ knowledge, issues in freedom. To engage in rational critique and thought is penetrate beyond the data of first-hand subjective understanding. Spinoza here redeems the emancipatory promise of philosophy, the promise that it is possible to separate truth from the shadows of illusion of the walls of Plato’s cave and make it available to all in the service of their freedom. Spinoza affirms the principal virtue of philosophy as that which permits human beings, through the use of their rational faculty, to progress beyond the partial, confused and contradictory evidence of sense-date to access a realm of necessary truths where everything has a rightful place in the eternal scheme of things. The exercise of the rational faculty makes it possible to achieve such absolute knowledge through ‘adequate ideas’ and hence to transcend our passive and unreflective dependence on sensory perception, the fallible workings of memory, imagination, language, and other such contingent, error-prone sources of ‘inadequate ideas’. To achieve this position is to contemplate everything sub specie aeternitatis.

This standpoint is Spinoza’s ultimate ideal, a regulative notion by which (as Spinoza argued) human beings can and should be guided on account of their possession of reason. What makes Spinoza so important, however, is his attempt to give this philosophical ideal a political relevance in historically given conditions of human finitude and temporal experience. That is, Spinoza’s ideal is more than a regulative ideal that functions as an impotent and impossible ‘ought-to-be’ with no practical and critical purchase on the ‘is’. Spinoza is no ivory tower philosopher and explicitly attempts to relate the philosophical issues of reason, truth and knowledge to contemporary socio-historical or political concerns. Spinoza projects his philosophical ideal within the limits imposed by socio-historical conditions, aiming to achieve a knowledge of actions and events sub specie durationis.

Historically, Spinoza’s ideals were commensurate with progressive or liberal democratic politics and theory. Much of this has come to form the mainstream of the Western political culture. But at the time that Spinoza wrote these values had to be defined against forces of social disruption – religious, sectarian, and resurgent monarchist interests – which threatened to destroy them at any time in a tide of hatred, bigotry and intolerance. Much that reads as reasonable and liberal now would have been very radical and left-wing at the time. How radical Spinoza’s philosophy really is, beyond temporal political controversies, is only clear when one makes the ethics the basis of the politics to reveal how much further Spinoza goes in the project of freedom than can be contained in the liberal platform of freedom of speech, tolerance etc. These classical liberal tenets were not ends to Spinoza but means to a greater end in which reason, truth, knowledge, freedom and power would coincide.

Spinoza is attempting to unite the ideal and the real. His method of reasoning more geometrico and the fact that he writes in Latin indicates an elite appeal to philosophers, an ideal community and a republic of letters raised above merely partisan opinions and interests. Spinoza here addresses those few who, capable of exercising reason and engaging in rational critique, have attained an active relation to their world. This is Spinoza’s ideal for all humankind. He recognises that this is not – yet – the real. No such ideal community could be found in the existing world. But Spinoza affirmed that it could be, if only people learned to reject inadequate for adequate ideas and so transform their passive relation to reality into an active one. In these conditions, philosophy could have a practical emancipatory function only if it adjusted to existing conditions of prejudice, unreason, and sectarian strife. Spinoza took full and detailed account of existing political and social circumstances, challenging confused or ‘imaginery’ ideas, conjoined with the seemingly contingent nature of historical events as viewed sub specie durationis.

In his day, and for centuries afterwards, Spinoza had enemies. ‘Spinozism’ quickly became equated with that strain of free-thinking rationalist critique which naturally earns powerful enemies in established institutions of Church and State. And, since these are the media control means of communication, information, education to reinforce popular prejudice in the service of existing structures of power, Spinoza has been slandered as an ‘atheist’ and worse. To such forces, Spinoza was to be feared, ridiculed and resisted as a thoroughly subversive thinker. To opponents he was an ‘atheist’ in acknowledging no God except Nature. It is just one small step from claiming that God is everywhere to claiming that God is nowhere, leaving us only with the Nature that is the visible real. Spinoza rejected the distinction between mind (or soul) and body, which is a central tenet of Christianity. And to top it all, he demanded an absolute freedom of conscience in matters of religious belief. 

Leaving aside the inaccuracies and exaggerations – Spinoza was not an atheist, but his God was not the transcendental Christian God – these points on which Spinoza was castigated at the time and after were also precisely the same grounds upon which Spinoza came in time to be revered. Yet Spinoza is to be rescued as much from his friends as from his foes. Spinoza is one of the most difficult of philosophers. Even those who have thought that they have understood him, have understood – and celebrated – him for the wrong reasons.
 A vague acquaintance with Spinoza’s work, limited to a few lines, has been responsible for a popular view of Spinoza as a visionary or mystic. This impression derives not from philosophers but from German and English Romantics and poets whose views, although having the merit of highlighting certain key aspects of Spinoza’s thought, have had the tendency to portray Spinoza, the pre-eminent philosopher of reason, as an irrationalist. To some, Spinoza was a man obsessed with God, ‘God-intoxicated’ soul to use the words of Novalis; a pantheist for whom every natural phenomenon is a revelation of an immanent but impersonal God. Shelley, whose poetry included direct steals from Spinoza, understood Spinoza in this way, as did Colderidge, who described Shakespeare as a ‘Spinozistic deity’, presiding serenely over worlds and characters of his own creating without the intrusion of personal interest or motive’ (see Christopher Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory 1991 21 43). Quite compatible with these views is the understanding of Spinoza as a harsh materialist and determinist who denies all significance to morality and religion. It is in this sense that Spinoza is currently undergoing something of a revival amongst ecological thinkers such as Arne Naess. However, this ‘Deep Ecology’ Spinoza is profoundly misleading to the extent that it portrays Spinoza as a Nature mystic. True, Spinoza is a philosopher in the high metaphysical tradition in making God the ground of all Being and the end-point of philosophic wisdom. But no intoxication is involved in the clear and, indeed, the cold and clinical way that Spinoza presents the proofs and axioms supporting his argument. Spinoza was the intellectual hero of the Romantic poets, a philosopher whose identification of God with Nature explained their own pantheist ideas of God, mind and nature as belonging to a single, indivisible order of harmonious coexistence. Yet there is a ruthless and compelling logic to Spinoza’s Ethics which sits very uneasily with the wild passion and loose words of poetry, Romanticism and, in the contemporary age, Deep Ecology. ‘God or Nature’ is more than a poetic phrase to Spinoza; Spinoza is the very antithesis of a Romantic or a Mystic, at least in the sense in which mysticism is commonly understood. Although Spinoza articulated a mystical sense of the fundamental unity of Nature to poets like Coleridge and Shelley and to Deep Ecologists like Naess, up to and including the 19th century Spinoza was celebrated by such individuals as Renan, Flaubert, Matthew Arnold, and Anatole France as the philosopher who above all philosophers had extended and demonstrated the powers of impersonal and dispassionate reason to extreme limits. Perhaps reason and mathematics are paths to a mystical sense of unity with the One. Spinoza is certainly a Rationalist and no philosopher has ever made such exalted claims for reason in such a clinically logical way. Spinoza argues not as a poet but as a mathematician. Spinoza takes his stand on the power of logical reasoning, and does no more and no less than reason and logic permits. At no point does Spinoza attempt to buttress the power of his rational argument by appealing to supporting authority or to emotion or to literary pretence. Neither revelation nor popular consent play any role in the making and the supporting of the arguments; they stand or faith by merit of their inner logic and reason. 
Spinoza’s philosophy is complicated and needs to be reconstructed with precision. To capture Spinoza’s philosophy in a line would amount to make the claim that reason is the way to freedom, that truth liberates, that knowledge is active power in relation to the world. This is a high theoreticist position which underlines the emancipatory function of reason. But this is only a partial – and hence misleading – understanding in so far as it neglects the critical point that Spinoza affirmed no mind-body dualism; and claims that Spinoza makes for reason embrace both mind and body. From this perspective, Spinoza shows that theory is a pointless and delusive endeavour when detached from the body. In a condition of mind-body dualism, concepts necessarily falsify the nature of lived experience. Spinoza’s rationalism is not an abstracted theoreticism prioritising the mind but affirms that the only reality is that of the body as a complex ensemble of drives, impulses and ‘desiring machines’. Thus ‘whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, the power of thought in our mind’ (E II, P 2 note).

1 PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
Spinoza stands supreme as the philosopher of reason in the modern world. No philosopher of weight and stature in recent centuries has made the exalted claims for reason that Spinoza made. One would need to go back to Aquinas to find rationalism of this purest kind, although the comparison is misleading to the extent that Aquinas’ reason is in the service of a pre-determined cosmology. One needs to go all the way back to Plato and the origins of philosophy to find a philosopher who possessed such an lofty vision of the scope and range of philosophical thinking at its purest, unsullied by interest and emotion. To Spinoza, the purpose of philosophy is to deliver the universe as a whole to human reason, render the universe intelligible, and to locate the place of human beings within the universe. That knowledge and intelligibility shows the extent and limit of human freedom.

Spinoza looks backwards and forwards at the same time. If Spinoza produced the last Latin masterpiece, the truth is that he adopted this classical language for greater precision in clarifying and ultimately destroying the conceptions of medieval philosophy. Within his system, Spinoza addresses all the major metaphysical and moral issues of philosophy and presents his answers clearly, forthrightly and without evasion or equivocation. Spinoza is the test case for those who are sceptical of metaphysics. Even sceptics can admire the intellectual form and magnificence of his grand design as he makes the most exalted claims that it is possible to make for philosophy and proceeds to support these claims by the power of pure reason (Hampshire 1951:12). Spinoza is in agreement with Plato and other great metaphysicians in presenting philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom and as providing the knowledge of the right way of life, how human beings ought to live. Philosophy is exalted among intellectual disciplines as the only complete and essential form of knowledge. It follows that philosophy must be the essential foundation of all other intellectual disciplines and searches for knowledge, all of which are partial in comparison to philosophy and hence subordinate to philosopher as the master-inquiry. Spinoza thus introduces his essay concerning the theory of knowledge On the Correction of the Understanding with personal statement that affirms the classical approach to philosophy, with a line of descent which goes back to Plato.





Spinoza’s philosophy is thus based upon an explicit identification of the discovery of the ‘true good’ as the fundamental concern of true philosophy; without knowledge of the true good, human joy and happiness is impossible. So, for all of the precision of the geometrical form and Latin language, philosophy to Spinoza is much more than intellectual interest or theoretical purity but addresses issues of supreme practical concern. The issues that Spinoza addresses in the way that he structured his philosophy can only be understood by emphasising the end of human freedom and happiness through the prescription of the right way of life.

With the increasing specialisation of knowledge through advance in scientific understanding, few would make claims as bold as these for philosophy. That said, Spinoza offers a means of challenging the way that the experimental methods of modern science have served to narrow the scope of pure philosophical speculation. Further, Spinoza shows how it is possible to validate the classical claims for philosophy as the true good whilst embracing the knowledge and understanding of the world as revealed by the latest scientific thought.

This chapter is foundational to the wider aim of distinguishing Spinoza the rationalist from his appropriation by Romantics and Deep Ecologists as a mystical, poetic God/Nature intoxicated thinker. In writing in Latin and in adopting the geometrical method, Spinoza sought to extinguish all emotional appeal from his argument, placing all the emphasis upon reason. Spinoza will be shown to have celebrated God and Nature through reason. This chapter will locate Spinoza in the philosophical tradition of ‘rational freedom’. In particular, the Aristotelian roots of Spinoza’s philosophy will be highlighted through the influence of Averroes and Avicenna.

Whilst Spinoza’s liberal democratic temper and politics can be explained by his life in the Dutch Republic, his philosophical influences are deeper and older. Spinoza was descended from Spanish Jews, who had settled during the sixteenth century on the borders of Spain and Portugal. The theologians and scholars in Spinoza’s Jewish background had played an integral part in the great revival of Aristotelian philosophy in the Middle Ages. This achieved its crowning glory in the Thomist synthesis after Thomas Aquinas adapted Aristotelian essentialism to Christian cosmology. This synthesis served the purposes of the medieval Catholic Church. But that Aristotle has a more subversive potential would have been clear to Spinoza through his own Jewish sources. The principal influences upon Spinoza in his youth were the Jewish and Moslem writers of the early medieval period, since these sources provided the main arguments of the Judaism with which Spinoza was brought up. The most important of these sources was Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides, 1135-1204) who influenced not only Judaism, but also over Islam and Christianity. Through these sources Spinoza would have gained a knowledge of the ideas of the Christian scholastics. It is significant that Aristotelian theology found its way into Spinoza not through Christian medieval scholasticism but through Jewish and Moslem sources. It was Maimonides who, through Moslem philosophers Averroes and Avicenna, established the Aristotelian undercurrent of medieval theology – an undercurrent which the Thomist synthesis attempted but ultimately failed to contain within the parameters of the Church. The Aristotle of Jewish and Moslem sources is very different from the Aristotle presented by the Christian Church. Ultimately, the naturalist and essentialist Aristotelian current led to Spinoza’s stark theism or pantheism which struck opponents as atheism.

Interpretations of Jewish and Moslem Aristotelianism combined to create in Spinoza an ethical position quite at odds with Christianity on all key points. In Maimonides, Spinoza discovered philosophy as a guide to the right way of life; in the Kabbalah, he discovered the conception of the ultimate identity between the Creator and his creation, of God as immanent. Beyond his formative years, Spinoza added two further crucial influences. From Descartes, Spinoza took his conception of metaphysics as the foundation of scientific knowledge; from the political philosophy of Grotius and Hobbes, Spinoza learned to relate the social nature of human beings to political circumstance, searching for the precepts best suited to the finite and erroneous condition of human beings.

All these ideas, medieval and modern, theological, political and scientific, emerge in a new and altered form in the Ethics. Spinoza can be seen as the realisation of the grand claims of classical philosophy, unravelling the controversies and antinomies of medieval thought to reconcile an Aristotelian theology with modern science. In this sense, Spinoza gave the modern scientific world a conception of human nature and of human happiness that served to vindicate the life of contemplation which for Aristotle was the highest good for man within a modern scientific understanding of the world as subject to human instrumental change and transformation.

The influence of Aristotle, particularly the Nichomachean Ethics, is pervasive. Spinoza agreed with Aristotle that the distinguishing attribute of human beings is the attribute of reason and that the ‘good life for man’ is dependent upon the exercise of the rational faculty. Reason is exercised in two distinct ways – theoretically and practically. Human beings achieve happiness only through the right exercise of practical reason, so as to fulfil human nature rather than to thwart it. In addition to reason, though, a human being also possesses emotion. Spinoza agreed with Aristotle in conceiving reason as a discipline which was required to channel emotions in the direction of happiness. Human happiness requires that the emotions be ordered by developing certain dispositions of character – the virtues - so that human beings spontaneously follow a path that is in accordance with rational nature. Where Spinoza departed from Aristotle, however was in his conception of the relation between reason and passion and in his idea of happiness. Here, Spinoza acquired more of a Platonic temper.


To Spinoza, the purpose of philosophy is to demonstrate the way to happiness. Here, Spinoza’s thought savoured more of Stoicism than of Aristotle in the sense that he stressed the capacity of human beings to achieve happiness and serenity by their own, inner, resources, without the interference of external circumstances or the need to realise one’s human powers in a social, political and material context. This temper is quite distinct from Aristotle’s conception of politikon bion  and from the conception of the human being as a zoon politikon, a social/political/urban animal. For Spinoza, the individual human being is his or her own destiny, responsible for their own misery and happiness regardless of circumstances. Not that Spinoza’s philosophy is without social and political implication. On the contrary, since the bulk of humankind neither aspire to nor achieve the inner freedom of the philosopher, and since they must learn to co-exist in peace and harmony, a system of laws and institutions must be devised which correspond to rational nature and which make collective life possible. In developing a political philosophy, Spinoza leans heavily upon Grotius and Hobbes. Spinoza agrees with Grotius in affirming the existence of a natural law, discoverable to reason, which specifies the ideal form of government; but he also agrees with Hobbes in making no distinction between rights and powers in reality so that the disposition of power is the very stuff of politics. Spinoza’s basic question, however, transcends any precarious synthesis of Grotius and Hobbes. The concern is that power be disposed in such a way as to express the rational nature and preserve the freedom of human beings through its exercise.

The final key influence upon Spinoza’s philosophy is the modern scientific viewpoint. It is by no means condescending to argue that Spinoza was the culmination of medieval thought, implying that Spinoza’s philosophy is on the cusp of modernity. In revealing the errors and unravelling the issues of past philosophy, Spinoza preserved and incorporated into a modern philosophy all that was of permanent value. The comprehensive ethical and political vision of Aristotelianism and medieval scholasticism that served to frame Spinoza’s theory of the universe. Spinoza had a total vision which revealed how human beings ought to live, how they could come to gain knowledge of their environment, act upon it, achieve joy and happiness within it. In the process, Spinoza demonstrated the fundamental unity of human beings and the world, revealing human beings to be both master and servant of an environment upon which they are always dependent and with which they may have a more active or more passive relation to. But the question of the relation of human beings to the universe was being put and answered in very new ways in Spinoza’s day.

Perhaps the corollary of seeing Spinoza as the culmination of classical and medieval philosophy, as a religious thinker in an age in which science was dispelling religion as illusion, is that he is seen as in some way secondary and subordinate to the more modern scientific advances of Descartes and Leibniz. As a ‘rationalist’, Spinoza is classified with these thinkers and, certainly, the label is justified in so far as all three were concerned in their work to indicate the intelligibility of the world to human reason. All three philosophers claimed the possibility of achieving the perfect scientific knowledge of Nature through a rational method which dispensed with faith, supernatural revelation and theological mystery to make the universe intelligible to human reason. Where they differed from each other was in their approach to obtaining natural knowledge, in the limits they set to human knowledge, and in the understanding of Nature.

In seeking clarity, rigour and certainty in philosophy and natural knowledge, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz took mathematics as a model and ideal. The words or symbols employed within mathematics denote clearly defined conceptions and do not derive meaning from the figures or images used to illustrate them. The mathematical or geometrical method purges terms of all the figurative and subjective associations of ordinary discourse. To achieve a similar purity, philosophy and natural science must conceive its terms as logical counters with a purely intellectual significance. In this conception of pure reasoning or Intellect, words stand for clear and distinct ideas. One can thus understand the extent to which the ‘rationalism’ which Spinoza defined with Descartes and Leibniz is diametrically opposed, in temper, language and style to the way that the Romantic Movement exalted Imagination. To understand Spinoza’s philosophy it is essential to understand how he opposed to clear and distinct ideas of pure reason to the unclarity and unreason of Imagination. Indeed, this concern on Spinoza’s part led him to learn Latin in order to more accurately express the concepts and ideas of his ethics. Latin, stripped of its poetical and conversational uses, could serve as a completely formal and abstract language which made it possible to express clear and distinct ideas without ambivalence, obfuscation and equivocation. Spinoza was to fire the poetic imagination of the Romantics by the force of his argument and not the persuasiveness of his words; in expressing his philosophy, Spinoza deliberately sought words which possessed a precise technical meaning, quite removed from any shifting and figurative uses in ordinary speech.

Spinoza wrote his  Ethics in Latin and used the geometrical method; he demonstrates the truth of this argument through a system of axioms, definitions, propositions, corollaries, etc. and takes Euclidean geometry as his model. Spinoza’s philosophy appears quite without literary artifice and construction, unfolding logically and cautiously as a succession of propositions with supporting proofs, lemmas and corollaries. Above all philosophers, Spinoza is the most uncompromising in his insistence that all problems, whether metaphysical, moral or scientific, can and must be formulated and resolved as purely intellectual problems. Spinoza makes no attempt to strengthen or reinforce his rational argument by means of literary persuasion to excite the emotions or engage the imagination of the reader. The presentation is cold and clinical. Spinoza’s personality, his own prejudices or predispositions, are completely absent. As the author of the Ethics, Spinoza is present only as the instrument of pure Reason. Having clinched each argument with axioms, proofs etc, Spinoza never allows himself so much as one self-satisfied or approving word. His philosophy is characterised by a dispassionate rationalism operating at its outer limits. Spinoza addresses the most passionate and controversial themes in philosophy – God, human nature, happiness, desire, truth and knowledge - and adopts a method more appropriate to the study of triangles and circles. Spinoza’s point is that it is only by developing the rational faculty and employing the geometrical method that human beings can achieve their supreme and only happiness and freedom; only by developing and exercising the rational faculty in this way, with dispassionate clarity in relation to the infinite, self-creating Universe, do human beings become more than insignificant fragments of that Universe.

In developing his position, Spinoza sought to resolve the contradictions he had identified in Descartes’ conceptions of Substance, of the relation of Thought and Extension, of the relation between God and the created universe, of Free-will and Necessity, of Error, and of the distinction between Intellect and the Imagination. Whether Spinoza was exposing genuine contradictions in Descartes’ philosophy or developing Descartes’ work to its logical conclusion is an interesting question. There is always a suspicion that Descartes deliberately refused to follow his rational method into some very dangerous moral and theological waters since he knew fine well that certain conclusions would have uncomfortable consequences. Ironically, Spinoza’s boldness in demonstrating philosophically the extent to which the rational method contradicted religious orthodoxy can make it appear that his work possesses a more religious, theological and, indeed, medieval character than that of the more modern and scientific work of Descartes and Leibniz. The truth is that the more worldly, ambitious and hence cautious Descartes and Leibniz pulled their punches with respect to religion maintain an orthodoxy in public which enabled them to retain their positions with a minimum of controversy. In contrast, it is Spinoza’s determination to address the weightiest of theological and political issues in his ethics that gives his work a much greater depth, surviving the vicissitudes of scientific advance.

The distinctions between Intellect and Imagination and between pure logical thinking and the confused association of ideas formed the foundation of Spinoza’s system. Spinoza proceeded in this way as a consequence of his philosophical approach to seeking true ideas above sense-data. The terms employed to understand the Universe as a whole must be clear and distinct so as to represent to us clearly-defined intellectual conceptions; this contrasts with the confused images or pictures derived from our sense-experience. In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza followed these distinctions to their logical conclusions and never shied away from their ethical or religious consequences, even though Spinoza was as well aware of the extent to which his philosophy invited controversy with respect to Christianity. Spinoza’s system argues that knowledge is achieved only by framing ‘adequate ideas’ whose truth is ensured by their conforming to the order of causal necessity which is manifest in every aspect of thought and experience. ‘That which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature … therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God, and nothing else’ (E I, p30). Whereas human beings can form an image or mental picture as a projection of their sense-experience, God, is essentially outside of experience. God cannot be portrayed by imaginative recreation of sense-experience, but only by an effort of pure thought. Restricted to ordinary language, the conception of God in our understanding is necessarily anthropomorphic; remove this anthropomorphism and ‘God’ loses the Christian connotations that most identify with God. This is essentially Spinoza’s approach to God, shedding the ordinary terms that made God comprehensible to the mass of humankind and leaving only a completely abstract and impersonal Deity. 

Spinoza follows the distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas to their logical conclusions, criticising ideas that come about only through our partial and distorted understanding of the causes that determine thoughts and actions, emphasising the supremacy of adequate ideas concerning those causes. The highest point of philosophical wisdom is to discard the illusions, whose errors have been the source of religious and political strife through the ages, and identify our existence within an all-embracing order of causal relations. Understanding the nature of that order of causal relations would put an end to illusion and hence to strife; such understanding is the extent and limit of human freedom. Understanding permits human beings to recognise their place in the eternal scheme of things, abandoning illusory ideals of personal autonomy to embrace true freedom as a condition of serenity and tranquillity achieved through self-possession. Though Spinoza’s great claim is to have identified reason with freedom through knowledge, his critics argue that his system affirms a hard-line determinism that eliminates free will and ethical choice. Human freedom amounts to the recognition of an unalterable necessity; there is no question of choice.
 
This conclusion follows Spinoza’s radical monism, the doctrine that subject and object (or mind and nature) are two ‘attributes’ of a single ‘substance’ and must be understood as such. The name of this single substance is interchangeably God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). God is self-caused (causa sui), the one and indivisible substance, and contains in itself all the modes and attributes that relate to the bodily and mental experiences of human beings. It follows from this that the knowledge of God denies any idea of the mind as existing in a realm apart from the order of natural or causal necessity. How far Spinoza had departed from the traditional (Judaeo-Christian) - the idea of an omnipotent transcendental deity whose powers are outside of all the laws or regularities of nature - God is now apparent. It is impossible to conceive of God as having the ‘freedom’ to suspend or abolish natural laws.If God and Nature are strictly interchangeable – if the divine substance is immanent in nature – then clearly it can make no sense to talk of a Creator apart from Creation. 

The Ethics comprises five parts. The first part, ‘Concerning God’, delineates Spinoza’s argument that God is not transcendental, apart from the world, but is immanent within the world. The second part, ‘Concerning the nature and origin of the mind’, addresses the major problem bequeathed by Descartes, the relation between mind and matter. Though Descartes argued that mind is a separate substance from matter, he acknowledge – and Spinoza demonstrated - that his conception of substance came with the implication that there can be no interaction between substances. The question arises as to the place of human beings in nature, and the possibility of knowledge. In answering those questions, Spinoza rejects Descartes’ premises. In the third part, ‘On the origin and nature of the emotions’, Spinoza presents his account of human nature, going on to address a major problem in his metaphysics: the question of individual existence. If God is all-embracing and if all that exists exists only in God, then what is the status of the individual things composing the world; in particular, how can each human being be considered an individual with a nature and a destiny that are their own? Spinoza addresses ‘Human servitude and the strength of the emotions’ in Part four. This part discusses the extent to which humanity, under the sway of passion, opinion and imagination, is in an enslaved condition which denies its true nature, and yet expresses at the same time the absolute perfection of the universe of which it is a component. In part five, Spinoza adumbrates ‘The power of the intellect or human freedom’ to demonstrate how human beings can achieve freedom and happiness through the exercise of reason, and how, as a result, it is possible to attain that absolute knowledge of the world which is the blessedness of God. Such is the outline and orientation of Spinoza’s philosophy, receiving its most complete statement in the Ethics.

2 OUTLINE OF METAPHYSICS

The first part of the Ethics sets about defining and elucidating the fundamental notions of Spinoza’s system - Substance, Cause, Attribute, Freedom, and Necessity. These notions are logically connected as Spinoza proceeds by explaining each in terms of the others, building up to his conception of God or Nature. Spinoza asks the  question ‘What exists?: ‘Except God no substance can be granted or conceived’, and ‘Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God’ (Propositions 14 and 15). Each of these terms - ‘God’, ‘substance’, ‘conceive’ and ‘in’ – possess specific meaning and are important technicalities in Spinoza’s philosophy. Sense is made of these terms in the first part of the Ethics in relation to Spinoza’s original and profound version of the ontological argument for the existence of God.
 
The idea of God as a self-created and necessary being upon which all things depend seems to deny free will and choice. Spinoza argues that all that exists is dependent upon and has meaning only in relation to a divine nature which is governed by necessity. It follows from this that everything in the world is necessary and nothing is contingent. In what sense, then, is it possible to conceive of human freedom? This old theological question was put with a new urgency as scientific advance revealed the increasing extent of the human power to understand and even transform the environment. The increasing understanding of nature seemed to be accompanied by an increasing demonstration of human power in relation to nature. The old theological attempt to reconcile human freedom with the eternal laws of God’s nature received new impetus.

To Spinoza, the ontological argument offered a paradigm of rationalist philosophy in that it starts from a ‘clear and distinct idea’ of God and proceeds by ‘clear and distinct’ steps to the conclusion that God exists, and exists necessarily. To previous philosophers, the ontological argument demonstrated that at least one thing [God] exists. Spinoza’s originality lies in demonstrating that the argument shows that at most one thing, and hence that everything which exists is, in some sense, ‘in’ God.
The axioms that Spinoza presents in this first part have important philosophical consequences. Thus Spinoza argues that ‘the knowledge (cognitio) of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and involves the same’ (Axiom 4). To state that A causes B comes with the implication that B’s existence and nature is dependent on A. This dependence between things is ‘expressed in’ or ‘conceived through’ a dependence between ideas. Reality and conception coincide in Spinoza’s philosophy so that relations between ideas correspond exactly to relations between things in reality. ‘The idea of B is dependent on the idea of A if its truth must be established by reference to the idea of A. The conclusions of a mathematical proof are therefore dependent on the premises. Mathematical reasoning is indeed a paradigm of the relation of ‘rational dependence’ between ideas. It is also a paradigm of ‘causality’, which is the relation that exists between A and B when the existence and nature of B must be explained in terms of A. Through proof we explain a conclusion, and if the premises are self-evident, we explain it completely’ (Scruton 35/6).

This argument implies that relations of dependence between things in reality are all intelligible as logical relations between ideas. ‘Thus something is independent if its properties follow from its idea: i.e. if you do not need to look outside the idea of the thing in order to explain it. B is dependent on A if the nature of B follows not from the idea of B but from the idea of A. All properties are in this sense dependent on, or caused by, the substances in which they inhere. And this is what Spinoza means by ‘in’: ‘B is in A’ is another way of saying that A is the explanation of B’ (Scruton 36/7).
The question that this raises is how can we be certain that the world is as it is conceived? In answering the question Spinoza would proceed from the self-evident premises from which reason begins, arguing by means of ‘clear and distinct ideas’. ‘A self-evident truth is precisely one in which the passage from thought to reality is accomplished: we perceive from the very idea that the world is as the idea represents it to be’ (Scruton 37).
Spinoza begins with a definition taken from Maimonides: ‘I understand that to be cause of itself [cause sui] whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing’ (E 1, Def. 1). This definition forms the contents of the world and is the whole subject matter of the Ethics. Spinoza proceeds to make a tri-partite distinction between ‘substance’, ‘attribute’ and ‘mode’.

Substance is ‘that which is in itself and is conceived through itself’, that, the conception of which does not require the conception of some other thing (E 1, Def. 3). This means that it is possible to obtain an ‘adequate idea’ of substance, that it is possible to understand the nature of substance without having recourse to anything outside of it. Spinoza goes further to argue that something which is conceptually independent in this way is also ontologically independent; it depends on nothing outside of itself for its existence (E 1, 6). It follows that ‘existence appertains to the nature of substance’ (E 1, 7), and that every substance contains within itself the complete explanation of its own nature and existence. Substance is necessarily ‘cause of itself’. The essence of substance necessarily involves existence, and substance cannot be conceived other than as existing. Spinoza thus explains existence by arguing that substance exists, and exists necessarily.

It makes sense to start with substance; substance had been the stuff of philosophy from Aristotle to Descartes. In the evolution of the concept, the distinction between a substance and its attributes had been developed to address a number of philosophical problems. In the first place, the distinction emphasise that there was a logical difference between the ultimate subjects of knowledge or judgement and the possible knowledge we may have of these subjects. In the second place, the distinction pertained to issues concerning change and identity, the fact that the subject of a judgement may persist through time as an identifiable subject with a whole series of different qualities inhering in it, expressing those different qualities at different times.

Any statement or claim to knowledge entails a claim that a subject or substance has a certain attribute – a quality it may be said to possess -  or that a subject or substance stands in a certain relation to another subject or substance. The attributes of a substance are of two categories. In the first place are the essential or defining attributes or properties of the substance; these are the fundamental attributes that make a substance the kind of thing it is. In the second place are the accidental attributes, which a substance may acquire or lose without its essential nature being changed. In the philosophical tradition, to know the essential attributes of a substance is to know the essence or real nature of a substance. Spinoza upholds this mode of reasoning, replacing the terms ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ with ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’.

The concept of substance is thus of long philosophical descent and is central in Spinoza’s metaphysics. But it was a concept in flux. Historically, the concept of substance was scientific as well as philosophical and was integral to the scientific investigation of the essential nature and the definition of the kinds of natural entity existing in the Universe. The scientific revolution dating from Galileo, involving the growth of mathematical physics, rapidly replaced the conception of scientific knowledge as consisting essentially of qualitative classification – the traditional Aristotelian logic – with the search for general quantitative laws in Nature. 17th century philosophy showed the impact of scientific discovery. The clash between science and religion, reason and faith, took peculiar form in Spinoza’s philosophy.

Many concepts with a long history were being revised, transformed or rejected in the process. Among these was the conception of the world as a plurality of substances, each in possession of certain essential attributes which persist through time. This conception had been stated many times since its origins in classical philosophy, in Democritus, but had been given renewed emphasis by Leibniz and Descartes. Spinoza’s denial of the conception came in response to the new statement of the plurality of substances and hence has the mark of breaking new ground.

Explanation to Spinoza, as a rationalist philosopher, involves demonstrating by necessary connexion that a true proposition is the logical consequence of another. A ‘necessary connexion’ is a strictly logical connexion that may be discovered by the logical analysis of the ideas involved.

Leibniz argued that Nature formed a system of self-determining substances, called monads. This raised the problem of whether substances can interact and, if so, how. The fact that substances are self-determining would seem to exclude interaction between them. For if substances can be said to interact, so that modifications of their nature or their states are the effect of the action of external substances upon them, they can no longer be wholly explained in terms of their essential natures. A substance originates change in accordance with its essential nature. This problem of how substances interact involves the notion of cause. 
In his earlier writings Spinoza affirms the principle that nothing exists but substances and modes [M Pt 1, ch 1; Pt 2, ch 1; C XII]. Importantly, modes are not restricted to the logical category of properties and relations but may include individual things. ‘When I say that I mean by substance that which is conceived through and in itself; and that I mean by modification or accident that which is in something else, and is conceived through what wherein it is, evidently it follows that substance is by nature prior to its accidents. For without the former the latter can neither be nor be conceived. Secondly, it follows that besides substances and accidents nothing exists really or externally to the intellect’ (C IV). Spinoza redefines the traditional distinction between substance and attribute as the distinction between substance and modification or mode [modus]. A mode is something which exists only in some other thing, upon which it depends, and hence cannot exist independently. The word ‘in’ is a technical term and denotes the relation of rational dependence.
Spinoza addresses this problem in the first few propositions of the Ethics.
The causal interaction of substances means that any modification cannot be explained as issuing as the effect of the essential nature of the substance involved. A fundamental distinction follows. Those attributes or modifications of a substance which are not to be explained as the necessary consequences of its essential nature can be described as accidental or contingent; those which can can be described as essential or necessary. A substance can be described as ‘cause of itself’ (causa sui) only if all of its attributes and modifications can be deduced from its own essential nature, as necessary and essential rather than accidental and contingent; and only such a substance can be so described. For Spinoza there can be only one substance which is causa sui, and this single substance must be identified with the universe conceived as unique all-inclusive totality; to this he gives the name ‘God or Nature’ (Deus sive Natura)’.

The traditional notion of a plurality of substances involved a distinction between essential or necessary and contingent or accidental properties. To argue that the notion of a plurality of substances involves a contradiction requires that Spinoza impose a restriction in the definition of substance so as to exclude this distinction. 

I understand substance to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: I mean that, the conception of which can be formed independently of the conception of another thing.

Pt I, Def III

Spinoza reveals the full meaning of this definition in the Propositions which depend upon it: ‘Two substances, which have different attributes, have nothing in common between them’ (E Pt I Prop II). ‘Of two things having nothing in common between them, one cannot be the cause of the other’ (E Pt I Prop III). ‘One substance cannot be produced by another’ (E Pt I Prop VI); ‘for if a substance can be produced from anything else, knowledge of it would depend upon knowledge of its cause’ (Axiom IV), and consequently (Def III) it would not be a substance’. This means that anything whose attributes are the effects of causes outside of itself cannot be called a substance; by definition, a substance is something whose attributes or modifications can be explained in terms of its own essential nature, and are therefore necessary rather than contingent.

Spinoza argues that rational understanding is the knowledge of causes and that everything can be explained as the effect of a cause (E Pt I Axioms III and IV).

To properly understand Spinoza’s philosophy it is essential to grasp what he meant by the term ‘attribute’. Spinoza defines an attribute ‘that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance’ (E 1, Def. 4). There are several – possibly infinitely many – ‘attributes’.


Only intellect is capable of grasping the essences of things. To know the essence of the wax it is necessary to consult the intellect rather than the senses. This theory is crucial in defining the rationalism of Spinoza’s philosophy. The nature of any thing can be understood a priori and disclosed to reason since extension constitutes the essence of whatever possesses it. The intellect has insight into the nature of a thing, from which the fundamental properties of extended things may eventually be deduced. By conceiving extension the intellect is acquainted with a ‘real essence’ that exists independently of the finite mind which conceives it. An attribute is therefore that which is ‘attributed’ to reality by the intellect.

God is defined as ‘a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence’. Since no ‘cause or reason’ is possible which could prevent the existence of such a being, it follows that God necessarily exists. This ontological argument applies to any substance, since by definition a substance is that which contains within itself [within its idea] the complete explanation of its own existence. That which owes its existence to an ‘external cause’ is a mode rather than a substance. To be affected by an ‘external cause’ is to be limited. A substance is unlimited by anything of the same nature as itself and is always ‘infinite in its own kind’. Thus every substance exists necessarily and infinitely.

Spinoza proceeded by inexorable logic to the conclusion that there can only be one substance, and that nothing can exist distinct or in independence from this single substance. The existence of one substance can be explained from the nature of that substance. However, such a priori explanation could not be offered for the existence of more than one substance of the same kind: ‘all things which are conceived to exist in the plural must necessarily be produced by external causes, and not by the force of their own nature’ (C XXIV). A substance of another kind, lacking God’s infinite perfections, would necessarily owe its existence to God, and therefore is not a substance but is a mode of God.

It follows that there can only be one substance, God, and everything which exists must be conceived as an attribute or modification of this single substance, is inherent in it. Spinoza identifies this single substance with Nature, conceived as the totality of things. This substance must be infinite in its nature. If it were finite, something outside or other than it could be conceived, constituting its limit, in which case it could not be single or unique. This means that God or Nature, the single substance as a whole, possesses an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite in itself.
 No substance other than God exists or can even be conceived. Since each substance is cause sui, to conceive of a substance is to conceive of it as existing and therefore – by the ontological argument – to establish its existence (E 1, 14). It follows that ‘Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God’. God is not distinct from the world but is identical with it.
By definition, God possesses infinite attributes and is therefore the single substance identified with Nature (E Pt I Def VI). Nature is properly identified with God. By inexorable logic Spinoza is drawn to the conclusion that the unique, infinite and all-inclusive Substance must be named as Deus sive Natura. Whilst Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature would later inspire the poets of the Romantic Movement, it is the product of exact definition and rigorous logic conceived on a much higher cognitive level than imagination. Appreciating this point clarifies the religious controversy which attached itself to Spinoza’s Ethics. Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature quickly attracted accusations of ‘pantheism’ and also atheism but also the praise of such as Novalis, who described Spinoza as ‘God intoxicated man’, celebrating the divine immanence of the whole of nature. Certainly, Spinoza’s God as immanent within Nature is not the transcendental God of Christianity, the Creator apart from the Creation. 
Spinoza would have rejected the views of both friends and foes for being based upon a misunderstanding of the God he defined. Spinoza’s God/Nature is essentially impersonal, a product of reason as opposed to imagination. Spinoza is very far from the poetic imagination. For Spinoza, the distinction between God and Nature is based upon imagination rather than reason and is inextricably bound up with the distinction between the Creator and the Creation. Whereas reason shows that God and Nature cannot possibly be distinguished, imagination interferes to attach anthropomorphic descriptions and images to God. Dissociating the word ‘God’ from such descriptions and images, ceasing to picture the deity as a person, reason proceeds to the recognition of the logical necessity of the identification of God and Nature. Spinoza reasons on the basis of the logic of causality so that explanation takes the form of proof. Spinoza’s God is the God of reason revealing the logical necessity at work in the causality of things.

Imagination has led to the notion of God as the Creator apart from Creation, an artificer presiding over Nature, including humanity, as his artefact. This God is imaged in anthropomorphic terms, as a super-person with a will and a purpose. For Spinoza, this attempt to conceive God through human analogy involves contradictions which have fired the controversies within theology and metaphysics throughout the centuries – over the problem of evil, free will, God’s freedom of choice and his God’s reasons for choosing the actual world rather than other possible worlds. Spinoza subjected the Christian idea of God the Creator, the product of the imagination, to logic and exposed it as a contradiction in terms.
Spinoza proved that there can only be a single substance, a self-determining and all-inclusive subject whose attributes or modifications are all explicable in terms of its own nature; he proved that this substance is essentially infinite in possessing an infinity of infinite attributes; and he proved that this single substance must be identified with Nature as a whole; the absence of this identification implies the existence of something other than the Substance itself, of which no cause could be found unless it were a Substance, ‘cause of itself’: but a plurality of substances is impossible.
Spinoza proves that the idea of a Creator distinct from the Creation, implying the existence of two substances, one the cause of the other, is contradictory since, by definition, the unique, self-dependent and self-sustaining substance cannot be created or produced by anything other than itself. The traditional Judaeo-Christian idea of Creation necessarily involves a dualism of substances which is self-contradictory according to Spinoza’s definition of substance. But what are the grounds for supposing that Spinoza’s definition is correct? Spinoza is on strong ground if challenged in this manner. For Spinoza has exposed by rigorous logic the antinomies which necessarily arise as a result of the distinction between the Creator and the Creation. Spinoza’s identification of God and Nature, from which the necessity of monism follows, involves no such antinomies. One destructive argument proceeds as follows: If the Creator is distinguished from the Creation, then this indicates the existence of something other than, or distinguishable from, God, limiting the power and perfection of God. God cannot therefore be infinite, perfect, and all-powerful since ex hypothesi the Creation, being distinguished from the Creator, must possess some attributes which God does not possess (E Pt I Prop IV).

Spinoza thus rejects the traditional distinction between the Creator and the Creation. For Spinoza, God is the immanent and enduring cause of all things (E Pt I Proposition XVIII). To argue that God is the transient cause is to conceive God as the agent who set the Universe in motion at a particular time by a single act or set of acts of creation, and then ceased. On this (for Spinoza, self-contradictory) assumption, God is therefore not eternal. The only causal role that God has in the explanation of change in the Universe is as a First Cause and nothing more. In contrast to the notion of God as ‘occurring and then ceasing’, Spinoza’s conception of God as immanent and enduring understands God as the eternal cause of all things; it makes no sense to attach a date to God’s causal efficacy, as though the act of creation were singular and temporal.

God the Creator exists in the world of the Creation and not outside, apart or beyond it;  God is not the ‘transient’ but the ‘immanent’ cause of all things (E 1,18 and S 30, 34 and 36ff). This means that everything that exists must be explained as parts of a single and all-inclusive system. This single substance is Nature, and no cause (not even a First Cause) can be conceived as outside or independent of the order of Nature. It follows from this view that natural things or events cannot be explained by transcendent causes or by a transcendent cause, since ‘transcendent’ means ‘outside the order of Nature’. The notion of a transcendent God or of God the Creator distinguished as transient cause from the Creation is incoherent in implying an act of creation which is somehow outside the order of Nature. God, or Nature, is the eternal cause of everything and of itself. God, or Nature, is therefore free in its self-creative activity since ‘that thing is said to be free which exists by mere necessity of its own nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone’ (E Pt I Def VII). This definition applies to God or Nature as a single, unique, all-inclusive substance and to nothing else. Only God or Nature as a whole is self-creating and is absolutely free. From this argument follows Spinoza’s most far-reaching proposition.

In the nature of things nothing contingent is admitted, but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature to exist and act in a certain way.

Ethics Pt I Prop XXIX

Since God is eternally and necessarily as it is, and since causality is a form of necessity, the world is governed by necessity and everything that happens does so by necessity. All things must necessarily be determined within Nature. Determined here means ‘not self-caused or self-creating’, since everything within Nature is intelligible only by being deducible, directly or indirectly, within the all-inclusive system of the unique substance which is God or Nature. Everything that happens could only have happened otherwise if God could have been otherwise (S 44): but this implies the possibility of another substance. Since Spinoza has shown that nothing can conceivably exist outside Nature, it follows that everything in the Universe is determined and nothing is contingent. Effects follow causes of necessity. Every human action, as a mode of God, proceeds within this unbreakable chain of necessity. Ideas such as ‘chance’ and ‘freedom’, as commonly understood in imagination, have no role to play. The intelligibility of the Universe requires that everything within it be conceived to be determined by necessary causes.

God or Nature is the only free and originating cause, and the only free cause on account of being the only self-creating cause. To grasp God or Nature as the free and self-creating cause is to understand Nature as Natura Naturans. Here Nature is conceived in its active capacity, intelligible in and through itself by actively creating itself and deploying its essential powers in its infinite attributes and in the various modes of these attributes. Nature can also be understood as the system of what is created, as the product of the creative endeavour, or as Natura Naturata (E 1, 29, Scholium). There is no contradiction here, delineating two contrasting approaches to or aspects of – active and passive capacity - the one identical reality. The one conceives God or Nature as the unique creator (Natura Naturans); the other conceives God or Nature as the unique creation (Natura Naturata). These are just two equally legitimate approaches to the same reality. It follows logically from Spinoza’s argument for the essential identity of the Creator and the Creation that every thing in the Universe is necessarily belongs to and is dependent upon a single intelligible, causal system. Nothing exists outside of the single, unique substance. The self-contained, self-sustaining system which constitutes the world is also self-explanatory in the sense that the existence and activity of all things in the Universe can be explained only by being deduced from the essential attributes and modes of the self-creating God or Nature. This system can be known adequately and clearly through its attributes, partially and confusedly through its modes. The complete knowledge of the cause of the existence or activity of anything entails having complete knowledge of the whole order of Nature. To understand the system in its totality, under the aspect of eternity, is to appreciate that everything in the world exists by necessity, and that it could not be otherwise. Spinoza’s radical monism, the pantheism of identifying God and Nature, envisages the ideal of a unified science in which every natural change is explained as a completely determined effect within a single system of causes. The aim of this completed science is the supreme good consisting in the adequate knowledge of God (S ch 8 and 9).
 
The notions of will and chance are meaningless in Spinoza’s definition of God/Nature. The terms appropriate to the voluntary and arbitrary world of human action do not apply here. God/Nature is the ‘eternal’ cause of everything but is not ‘in’ time and does not take part in change. Indeed, the notion of ‘change’ and ‘process’ apply not to the divine nature but only to modes of God. They are partial and confused perceptions which fall short of an adequate idea of the world. A true knowledge of God/Nature requires that these terms be exhibited in their timeless relation to the eternal essence of God. Thus an ideal science is like a true religion in seeking to see the world not in its temporal dimension, but ‘under the aspect of eternity’ [sub specie aeternitatis], in the manner of a mathematical proof.
 
Spinoza’s rationalism here grasps the true knowledge of the world on the model of mathematics. Just as, for the mathematician, there is no gap between how numbers are and how they are represented by our proofs, so Spinoza argues that there is no disparity between how the world is and how it is represented by reason of ‘clear and distinct ideas’.
 
In fine, God or Nature is both self-creating and self-created, is eternal and possesses infinite attributes, is the cause of all things, and is free in acting entirely according to the necessary laws in its own nature. Every single thing within the single substance God or Nature is dependent and determined in being affected by causes other than itself; no thing within God or Nature can be explained wholly as the effect of its own essential properties or essence but requires knowledge of an external cause for complete knowledge and explanation of any finite thing. The essence of things produced by God does not involve their existence; their existence cannot be explained by reference to their own essential attributes since they are not self-created, their (E Pt I Prop XXIV). Of God/Nature alone can it be said that essence involves existence and vice versa since only in God/Nature are essence and existence equivalent (E Pt I Prop XX).

Spinoza’s philosophy is apt to be misunderstood as a result of the tendency to grasp his God/Nature by way of human analogy. Spinoza was at pains to make clear that the terms he applied to God/Nature do not have the meaning that they have with reference to human activities. The failure to understanding this as a logically necessary principle has been, according to Spinoza, responsible for the controversies of traditional theology and metaphysics. Spinoza repeatedly points out that no term applied to God/Nature has the same meaning as when applied to human beings; Spinoza is ruthless in rooting out anthropomorphism so that only logic and reason remain. Thus to describe God as a free cause involves a definition of freedom that is quite distinct from the meaning human beings normally ascribe to the term. To conceive God/Nature as a free and originating cause or creator creates difficulty only by way of human analogy so that ‘free’ in the sense Spinoza ascribes to God comes to be equated with ‘voluntary’, which is how freedom is understood in relation to human action. Since, for Spinoza, God/Nature acts and creates freely on account of acting necessarily, it makes no sense to debate whether such action and creation is undertaken either voluntarily or involuntarily – things could be no other way. ‘Things could not have been produced by God in any manner or order other than that in which they were produced’ (E Pt I Prop XXXIII). God/Nature is free in Spinoza’s sense on account of being self-determined and there is no room for voluntary, ie arbitrary and undetermined, choice in the notion of self-determination.

Spinoza denies the possibility of a transcendent Creator distinct from his Creation to conceive God/Nature to be immanently and eternally self-creating and free in the sense of self-determined. The logical conclusion of this position is that the Creation is an act of necessity rather than of will or choice. ‘The power of God is the same as his essence’ (E Pt I Prop XXXIV); ‘Things could not have been produced by God in any manner or order other than that in which they were produced’ (E Pt I Prop XXXIII).

Spinoza argues that God is the eternal cause of the existence of all things, and of the possession of the essential attributes all things possess; ‘God is not only the effecting cause of the existing of things, but also of their essence’ (E Pt I Prop XXV). To explain the essential attributes or properties which all things possess requires that the possession of these attributes must be shown as deducible from the all-encompassing system of Nature, i.e. as deducible from an adequate knowledge of the essential and eternal attributes and modes of God’s being. This is what Spinoza means when he argues that ‘The power of God (i.e. to produce) is the same as his essence’. 

It makes no sense to conceive of God/Nature’s creative power (Natura Naturans) as possibly creating worlds other than the created Universe (Natura Naturata) since this would suggest a lack of identity between Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata, that God as creative power (Natura Naturans) is not co-extensive with the created Universe (Natura Naturata). The actual world is not the best of all possible worlds, as Leibniz argued, but is the only possible world; there is no possible beyond the actual. The created Universe is the necessary expression of God’s essential nature. It therefore makes no sense to refer to God as exercising choice or will in creation.

Spinoza’s conception of God or Nature as a single, self-determining, all-encompassing system is rigorously logical; the system is self-contained and operates by causal necessity. Spinoza’s system of propositions and definitions conceive God or Nature as a single substance upon which all things depend so efficiently that, if one follows his argument from any point, it is possible to proceed by logical connexion throughout his whole system and find one’s way back to the beginning.


3 ON THE ATTRIBUTES

For Spinoza, an attribute is that which the intellect perceives to be the essence of a substance. ’By “attribute” I mean that which intellect perceives as constituting the essential nature of substance’ (E Pt I Def IV). And what the intellect perceives to be the essence of a substance, is the essence of that substance since an attribute is not distinct from a substance but inheres in it. As Spinoza stated the point prior to the Ethics: ‘Being as being, by itself alone, as substance, does not affect us, and therefore is to be explained by some attribute, from which it is yet not distinguished, save ideally’ (M Pt 1, ch 3). 

Spinoza develops his argument for God/Nature ‘God or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which express eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists’ (E Pt I Prop XI). The attributes of the single substance God/Nature are simply the essential nature of God/Nature as perceived by the intellect, and are called ‘attributes’ since in conceiving substance intellectually ‘the intellect attributes a certain nature to substance’ (C IX).(Letter IX). . ‘Each attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself’ (E Pt I Prop X). But since the essential nature of God/Nature is infinite, it can be perceived by the intellect in an infinity of ways; for this reason an infinity of attributes must be allowed. Further, since each attribute is the essential nature of God/Nature as perceived by the intellect, it is itself infinite in its own kind. An attribute that is not infinite could not be an expression of the essential nature of God. There is therefore an infinity of attributes, each attribute being infinite in itself.

A ‘complete and adequate idea’ of God gives the attribute, its ‘adequacy’ showing as God is in essence. An attribute is therefore more than an essential property in that it constitutes the essence of God in a way that a property does not, however essential it may be to existence. For Spinoza, thought – the system of ideas – and extension – the system of physical objects – are the two attributes of God. 

Proceeding from self-evident premises, deductive reasoning would reveal the ‘causal laws’ and relations of dependence within God/Nature. A science of  extension would thus yield complete knowledge of the physical world as a self-dependent totality. All physical objects and occurrences can be explained within the physical world as a self-sufficient system. A science of extension yields knowledge of an essence and therefore of the substance in which that essence inheres; it follows that extension is an attribute of God.

Extension raises the question of the relation between mind and body. Only if things are modifications of a single substance can a causal relation between them exist. Alongside the a priori science of the physical [of reality conceived as extension], there is the possibility of an a priori science of the mental [of reality conceived in mental terms through the clear and indubitable knowledge of ideas. For ideas apprehend the totality of things through another of God’s attributes. 

Extension and thought are the two all-pervasive features of the self-creating Universe as it presents itself to the limited human intellect. These refer to the Universe as a system of extended or spatial things (extension) and the Universe as a system of ideas (thought). Extension and thought are not two distinct substances, a self-contradictory conception, but must be conceived as two attributes or aspects of a single inclusive substance or reality. Thinking substance and extended substance pertain to the one and the same substance: ‘the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension’ (E 2, 21, Scholium)’. ‘Whether we think of Nature under the attribute of Extension or under the attribute of Thought or under any other attribute whatever, we shall discover one and the same order, or one and the same connexion of causes’ (E Pt II Prop VII, Note). Ideas and physical objects are modifications of a single reality. Thus everything extended in space is at the same time truly conceived as being extended in space; the single inclusive system of God/Nature can be conceived equally, and no less completely, as a system of extended or spatial things or as a system of thinking or animated things.
 
Spinoza argues that everything that exists, exists necessarily, in thoroughgoing interdependence. The radical monism that this implies renders human ethics problematic. It is unclear whether it makes sense to claim that anything actually ‘happens’ in the single substance conceived by Spinoza since everything ‘happens’ by necessity. It is less than clear whether the question of how human beings should act can be asked let alone answered on Spinoza’s premises. Further, Spinoza’s conception of human beings as parts of God/Nature’s causal necessity would seem to deny the identity, separateness, and self-sufficiency that common conceptions make integral to the definition of human personhood and autonomy; the human individual seems to have the same status as rocks, stones and trees in the whole scheme. What Spinoza has proved applies to all things no less than human beings, all of which are, in varying degrees, animate.

‘Freedom’ belongs not to human beings as such but to human beings in relation to the all-inclusive totality of God/Nature. For Spinoza, the union of the minds of human individuals with the bodies of human individuals is only a special case of the general identity of causal order in Nature. It is in raising and addressing these features that the true originality of Spinoza’s philosophy is revealed – in relation to the mind and body dualism, individual existence, and freedom and happiness as a result of the knowledge of God/Nature. Spinoza’s argument concerning thought and extension has to be distinguished from the dualism of mind and body, mental and physical more familiar in theology and philosophy. Both thought and extension represent reality as it essentially is, each attribute yielding complete knowledge of that reality. For this reason, every mode can be described both in mental and in physical terms.

For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body: thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of everything else. But still we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than the other and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

E Pt II Prop XIII Note

What this means is that there can be no ideas which are not ideas of extended things, or extended things of which there is no idea since all things that exist must belong to the unique self-determining substance and are both at the same time extended things and ideas of extended things.
 
The only real cognitive relation that could exist between an idea and a material thing, is the relation that exists between an idea, which is a mode of the single substance conceived under the attribute of thought, and the very same mode conceived under the attribute of extension. Spinoza shows that the system of ideas constituting God/Nature, as conceived under the attribute of thought, must correspond to and coincide with the objects of these ideas, their ideata. The doctrine of the two Infinite attributes of God or Nature therefore leads to the proof that ideata and ideas coincide – whatever is actual is rational and vice versa. For each ideata there is an ideatum so that degrees of rationality and degrees of reality must be in connexion at every stage. It follows that, properly schooling the intellect through clear and distinct ideas to attain the highest order of rationality, human beings are no longer subordinate parts of Nature in coming to approximate to the condition of God.





Descartes’ problem of ensuring our clear and distinct ideas correspond to reality does not arise since there is an ultimate correspondence between the ‘order of things’ and the ‘order of ideas’. The question of the correspondence between the order of ideas and the order of things cannot arise since there are not two orders to correspond within God/Nature rightly conceived as a single substance. 
Spinoza thus argued that Descartes erred in asserting a mind-body dualism – distinguishing res cognitans and res extensa – that no amount of sophistical juggling with categories could overcome. Against Descartes, Spinoza affirms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ as attributes of the same single substance. The mind is ‘the idea of the body’ (E 2, 13) and is ‘not simple, but composed of many ideas’ (E 2, 15); to each of the components of mind there corresponds a bodily process which is its ‘object’ or ideatum. ‘Adequate ideas’ do not, therefore, exist in a cognitive realm distinct from bodily or sensuous impressions. Mind and body are two aspects of one single substance, and to conceive that one thing as mind on the one hand or as body on the other is to divide the indivisible substance into two separate and incommensurable systems.
 
Spinoza abolished Cartesian dualism by conceiving mind and body as alternative attributes, either of which would appear sub specie aeternitatis as aspects of the single indivisible substance God/Nature. Thus ‘the body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion, nor rest, nor anything else, if there be anything else’ (E III, p2). Spinoza thus combined ontological monism with conceptual dualism by arguing that freedom arises from adequate knowledge of the ultimate unity of mind and matter; that such knowledge is attained through the exercise of critical reason; and that the mind-body dualism is metaphysically untenable since bodily impressions only exist as ‘ideas’ in the mind, while this mental activity cannot be conceived apart from its embodiment in this or that mode of physical existence. Thus, ‘substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other’ (E II, P7)

Freedom as ordinarily understood in terms of will and choice is a delusion; true freedom is the understanding and appreciation of necessity. There is no question of choice, only of recognition of the fact ‘that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest’ (E III, P 2 note).

Spinoza is clear that the understanding of freedom in the voluntarist and arbitrary terms of will and choice is an illusion which generates all manner of controversies and  paradoxes through a failure to understand necessity in terms of the causal relations of God/Nature and how relations of dependence within this single indivisible substance determine every last thought and action. The much vaunted freedom or autonomy of the human will is the product of a condition of ignorance, entailing a certain privileging of mind over the body whereas, in truth, the body ‘far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, infinite results follow’ (E III, P 2, note).

It follows from Spinoza’s premises that Cartesian dualism is incoherent since mind and body are likewise subject to the laws of logical and natural necessity; that true freedom derives from the recognition of necessity through acting in accordance with the dictates of reason and nature alike as distinct to the imaginary and illusory conception of freedom as will or choice.

To argue that Spinoza reveals human beings to be subordinate parts of Nature, subject to God’s/Nature’s necessity, understates Spinoza’s point that human beings may be more or less subordinate to the degree that they ascend or descend the scale between the animal and the divine as whole persons. Human beings cannot but be parts of Nature but they can alter their degree of subordination by developing the power and perfection of their minds and bodies, of their integral personality. For every body in nature there is an idea of that body. The power and perfection of the mind corresponds to power and perfection of the body, and vice versa. The mind of the individual approximates the mind of God and reflect the whole order of Nature to the degree that the order of ideas constituting mind approximates to the order of ideas constituting the infinite attribute of thought in God or Nature; to this to that degree of approximation my mind may be said to reflect the whole order of Nature.

Extension and its Modes
All things that exist in the Universe are to be conceived as a ‘modification’ of the unique, all-inclusive substance, God or Nature. The nature of this single substance is revealed under the two infinite attributes, Thought and Extension. But it is necessary to distinguish the all-pervasive features or modes of the Universe, which can be immediately deduced from the nature of these attributes themselves, from those modes which cannot be so immediately deduced.

 The modes of Reality which seem essential to the constitution of these two infinite and eternal attributes must also be infinite and eternal. Spinoza therefore distinguishes these modes as the immediate infinite and eternal modes. The modes descend in an order of logical dependence from the immediate infinite and eternal modes as necessary and universal features of the Universe to the finite modes which are limited, perishing and transitory differentiations of Nature. Since the finite modes are dependent on the modes of higher order, it is possible to understand them and deduce their essence or nature only as effects of the infinite and eternal modes. The infinite and eternal mode under the attribute of Extension is given the name Motion-and-Rest.

Since there is no external cause for change in the system, the proportions of motion and rest within the system as a whole must be constant; nevertheless, the proportions of motion and rest are constantly changing in the interaction occurring between the subordinate parts of the system.

Understanding ‘Motion-and-Rest’ as ‘energy’, Spinoza emerges as an ecological thinker who affirms that the extended world is self-contained system in which the total amount of energy is constant and in which the changing qualities and configurations of extended bodies occur as exchanges of energy. The rejection of a transcendent creator apart from the created universe may therefore be understood as ruling out the possibility of energy entering into the system from outside. The physical world is therefore self-contained in being self-generating and self-sustaining and, as such, savours a great deal of James Lovelock’s Gaia principle.

We may, if we go on ad infinitum, conceive the whole of Nature as one individual, the parts of which (that is to say, all bodies) change in infinite ways, without any change of the whole individual.

E Pt II Lem VII Note

Spinoza defines the highest order as ‘the face of the whole Universe’ (facies totius Universi). It is ‘a mediate infinite and eternal mode’ under the attribute of extension in the hierarchy of the system of modes on account of being logically dependent on the immediate mode of motion-and-rest, which is the primary, or logically prior, feature of extension.
All finite modes within Nature are ‘affected in many ways’ by other finite modes through constant interaction with each other and the environment, maintaining that internal cohesion dependent upon the relative constancy of balance of motion-and-rest within it. They are also affected by the transmission of motion to its parts which constitute change within Nature. The more complex a particular thing is, the more configurations it contains, the greater the variety of ways it has to affect and be affected by its environment. This understanding of complexity implies a scale of power. Among natural objects, the human body is placed high in this scale, animals and so-called inanimate objects lower in the scale. The human body, therefore, is in this sense ‘more excellent and contains more reality’ than animal or vegetable bodies; and ‘to contain more reality’ means to possess more power’. Further, the idea of which a human body is the ideatum, and which is a human mind, is also ‘more excellent and contains more reality’, and must reflect a relatively wider range of causes in the Universe (Hampshire 1951:76).
Spinoza represents the differences between living and non-living, conscious and unconscious things as differences of degree of structural complexity. Ultimately, the development of all finite modes of extension must be explained in purely physical terms of transmissions or exchanges of energy among groups of elementary particles. However, the understanding of organic and living systems require a conception of individual self-maintenance, which Spinoza supplies through the notion of conatus. 
Since he is defining a unitary method of scientific explanation, Spinoza extends this principle of the relative cohesion or self-maintenance of particular things, and of the differentiation among them, to all levels of organisation, and applies it to the simplest mechanical systems as well as to organic and living systems (Hampshire 1951:78/9). But he goes further to argue that the tendency to self-maintenance throughout internal change is the more noticeable in the higher-order systems on account of the greater possible variety of internal change within those systems, consisting of configurations within configurations through many levels. The persistence of equilibrium and self-maintenance of the whole despite internal diversity through the constant dissolution and replacement of sub-systems is much more conspicuous in of organic and living systems.
Spinoza’s conception of the modal system of extension anticipated the conceptual and theoretical methods of modern science. ‘It was not until the end of the 19th century that his three conceptions (a) of motion-and-rest as the essential and universal feature of the extended world, and (b) of ultimate particles as centres of energy, and (c) of configurations of these ultimate particles forming relatively self-maintaining systems, were seen to correspond with actually used scientific concepts’ (Hampshire 1951:78/9).

Spinoza refers a finite mode ‘in so far as [quatem or quatenus] it is in itself’ (for example E 3, 6). This indicates the sense in which finite modes may be self-dependent or ‘in’ themselves in the way that God is self-dependent. The way that Spinoza defines essence applies to finite modes as well as to God: ‘that pertains to the essence of a thing which, when granted, necessarily involves the granting of the thing, and which, when removed, necessarily involves the removal of the thing; or that without which the thing, or on the other hand, which without the thing can neither exist nor be conceived’ (E 2, Def 2). The inherent resistance of things to change indicates the extent to which they endeavour to persist in their own being. Without this endeavour [conatus] a thing cannot exist; the conatus of a thing therefore constitutes its essence. It is also the causal principle by which to explain the persistence and properties of a thing. The more conatus a thing has, the more it is self-dependent and the more it is ‘in itself’.
 
Each finite mode, interacting with other finite modes within the environment, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and the preservation of its own identity. Spinoza defines this as a ‘striving, so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in its own being’ (E Pt III Prop VII). This ‘striving’ (conatus) towards cohesion and to the preservation of its identity constitutes the essence of any particular thing; in no other sense can any particular thing which is not a substance be said to have an essence.

Each finite mode possesses a determinate nature of its own only in so far as it is active rather than passive in relation to other things. Only in so far as a thing is an originating cause is it possible to attribute any individuality or any determinate nature of its own to it, bearing in mind that no dependent mode can be entirely an originating cause. Spinoza grasps the striving towards self-maintenance of all particular things within the common order of Nature through the notion of conatus. This notion allows Spinoza to avoid a mechanical or atomistic account of the universe so that each finite mode comes to be recognised as a unitary thing with a recognizable constancy of character in so far as, although a system of parts, it becomes self-maintaining in its own characteristic coherence and balance of parts.

The conception of conatus impacts upon the relation between body and mind so that ‘the mind .. endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and is conscious of this its endeavour’ (E 3, 9) (Scruton 62). The endeavour of the body is also an endeavour of the mind and in mental terms is conceived as will [voluntas]. Whether body and mind are referred to as describing a things conatus, going on to use the term ‘appetite’; or whether the element of consciousness that gives things appetites and makes them aware of them is referred to, going on to use the term ‘desire’ (cupiditas) (E 3, 9) – all these terms refer to the conatus that causes a thing to operate in persistent and active self-dependence apart from its surroundings.

4 KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECT

Spinoza’s theory of the mind is deduced from the conception of God or Nature as single indivisible substance. The ‘human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God’ (E Pt II Prop XI, Corol) and is a particular modification of God or Nature’s infinite power of thought. Since a created substance is a self-contradiction, the human mind cannot be a created substance. The human mind is the expression in idea of the successive states of the human body; the mind is constituted by ideas whose objects or ideata are states of an individual human body. Since the human mind is the idea of the human body there is a necessary connexion of causes between mind and body so that every bodily change is a mental change and vice versa.

Spinoza does not recognize a causal relation between mind and body in any simple sense. Anything can be conceived either as idea or as extended thing. However, there can be a causal relation between two things only if the conception of one involves the conception of the other. Although an idea may depend upon another idea and a body upon another body for its conception, at no point in either the system of ideas or science of extension can intelligible reference be made to a physical mode or to the mental since the two systems are parallel but incommensurable expressions of a single whole. However, since ‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things’ (E 2, 7), there is no problem in relating the mind to things outside it, or in displaying its position in the unfolding sequence of natura naturata: ‘The order or concatenation of things is one, whether nature is conceived under one or the other attribute; it follows therefore that the order of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous with the order of the actions and passions of the mind ..  [thus] the decision of the mind, together with the appetite and determination of the body, are simultaneous in nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained in terms of it, we call decision, and when considered under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call causation’ (E 3, 2 Scholium).

For every idea there is an ideatum – an object conceived under the attribute of extension. Every ideatum corresponds exactly to the idea of it in the system of the world. Every idea is ‘of’ its ideatum and displays the ‘extrinsic’ mark of truth in having an exact and necessary correspondence to its ideatum (E 2, Def 4). Since many ideas fail to possess the ‘intrinsic’ marks of truth, Spinoza does not deny the possibility of a false idea. Spinoza is concerned to abolish the error that results from the confused and partial conception of things. To grasp the full system of ideas, and the relations of dependence which hold between them requires ‘adequate’ ideas so that thought comes to display things as they are. Spinoza’s ‘adequate’ ideas are comparable to Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct’ ideas in discerning the intrinsic marks of truth (E 2, Def 4) and, indeed, Spinoza frequently adopts the Cartesian terminology (E 2, 28). Adequate ideas are transparent to the world whereas inadequate ideas are opaque. Hence Spinoza writes that ‘between a true and an adequate idea I recognise no difference, except that the epithet “true” only has regard to the agreement between the idea and its ideatum, whereas the epithet “adequate” has regard to the nature of the idea itself’ (C LX).

Since truth as an intrinsic property of adequate ideas, there can be no gap between the world and the adequate conception of it. Further, Spinoza offers a proof that every adequate idea is self-evident to the person who possesses it (E 2, 43). 

‘The particular finite mode of Extension which is my body interacts, or exchanges energy with, its environment, and every such interaction is reflected in an idea; changes of state, which are the effects of the impinging of external bodies on the particular finite mode which is my body, are reflected in ideas which are ideas of imagination; such ideas represent the lowest and common level of human knowledge. In so far as my mind consists of such ideas of the imagination or of ‘vague experience’ (experiential vaga), it is said to be passive, not active; for the idea does not reflect an activity of mine, and is not the effect of a sequence of previous ideas in my mind’ (Hampshire 1951:84/5).

Spinoza constructs a theory of knowledge (which is in fact a theory of error) from the assumption that there really are adequate ideas (S 2, 15 and 16, E 2, 35ff) (Scruton 65). Spinoza is concerned with the explanation of error and of ordinary, imperfect knowledge in order to overcome the ignorance and unscientific thinking that embeds error in ordinary language. 

By imagination or ‘confused experience’, Spinoza delineates knowledge or awareness derived from sense-perception. An idea at this level represents neither the true nature and essence of the body nor the true nature of the external object; it represents a particular modification of extension, but does not in itself reflect the true causes of this modification. In critiquing knowledge deriving wholly from sense-perception as subjective and partial rather than being genuine knowledge, Spinoza is firmly within the rationalist tradition of philosophy going back to Plato’s distinction between knowledge and opinion. Thus Spinoza distinguishes three levels of knowledge, the lowest level of which is (cognitio primi generis), knowledge wholly derived from sense-perception and which corresponds to Plato’s ‘opinion’. What distinguishes Spinoza here is the way that the rationalist conclusion is deduced as a necessary consequence of conceiving the mind as the idea of the body, in conjunction with the premise that only logically necessary propositions represent genuine or certain knowledge. 

Genuine or certain knowledge is by definition a set or sequence of ideas in which each follows logically from its predecessor. However, in so far as we are not engaged in pure thought, our mental life is a sequence of ideas reflecting the successive modifications of the body in its interaction with other bodies, and such a sequence is never logical since these ideas logically unrelated to each other. Sense-perception can never therefore yield genuine knowledge, only incomplete knowledge in that they it cannot represent the true order of causes in Nature. Such ideas of imagination or confused experience constitute our common-sense knowledge.

Since their ideata are human bodies which are only finite modes, subordinate parts of Nature, such ideas cannot wholly represent the order of causes in Nature. To wholly represent the order of causes in Nature requires the one complete deductive system, ‘the infinite idea of God’ (infinitia idea Dei), which is the counter part in idea of the ‘face of the whole universe’. Complete and coherent knowledge of external bodies and our own bodies cannot be obtained wholly from sense perception. The ideas of imagination or confused experience represent only interactions between my body and other things but cannot adequately represent the order of causes of these interactions. 
The ideas of imagination come to us in the order of our bodily processes rather than in their intrinsic logical order. For this reason, such cognition cannot reach adequacy. Imagination is what Plato understood as ‘opinion’ and is the lowest level of cognition. At this level there is a passive association of ideas in that the presence of one idea suggests another idea. Genuine thought goes further to demonstrate the logical concatenation of ideas; here, the order in which ideas become associated is one of logical necessity and is therefore an activity rather than, as with ideas of imagination, a passivity of the mind. By the steady accumulation of ideas of imagination and confused experience it is possible to apprehend a universal notion (notio universalis) that is common to them, such as is exemplified in the common conceptions of man, tree, dog etc. (E 2, 40, Scholium). The ideas of ordinary language belong, in the main, to this class of composite but confused conceptions rather than of adequate ideas.

Experience exhibits certain characteristic ‘linkages of ideas’ which are ‘not in accordance with the order of the intellect’, but which are ‘in accordance with the order and linkage of the affections of the human body’ (E Pt II Prop XVIII Note). These non-logical associations of ideas constitute all ordinary common-sense. This is pre-scientific knowledge in that it is based upon testimony, habit and memory rather than systematic and logical investigation. The ideas which are imbedded through the passivity of the mind are merely the effect of repetitions in the modifications of the body. This passive reception of ideas of imagination in the common order of experience constitutes the ordinary mental life of humankind is still thought (cogitatio), but this term applies to every kind of mental life rather than specifically to the activity of the intellect. For Spinoza insists that these ideas that are passively absorbed into our mental life are not clear and distinct ideas issuing from explicit definitions and deliberate logical analysis but confused images or ‘imaginations’ (imaginationes). The common notions of ordinary discourse, and all ideas of the imagination and confused experience are therefore subjective and uncertain. For this reason Spinoza assigns knowledge gained through sense-perception to the lowest of the three levels of cognition. ‘Such knowledge is the source of those empiricist or commonsense delusions which result from our not subjecting such ideas to a process of rational critique. ‘Falsity consists in privation of knowledge, resulting from inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas’ (E 2, 35). Sense perception is a prime example of inadequacy. To someone on earth, the sun appears to be a small red disc a few feet in diameter suspended in a sea of blue. The image which constitutes the perception of the sun is an idea, but the ideatum of that idea is not what it seems to be to the perceiver. Sensory perception misleads in so far as it induces imagination to confuse the two distinct realms of empirical self-evidence on the one hand and necessary truth on the other. ‘Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present; yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing’ (E V, P 134).

There is a need, therefore, to ascend the scale of levels of knowledge to attain scientific knowledge. In this ascent, ideas of modifications become increasingly ‘concatenated’ or logically coherent so that the causes of  modifications come to be understood more fully. True knowledge of the sun cannot be gained through modifications of bodily processes. What is required is a science which proceeds by reasoned reflection from first principles to provide an adequate idea of the sun. This science belongs to the second level of cognition. This level involves adequate ideas and ‘common notions’ (notions communes), to be distinguished from ‘universal notions’ (notio universalis). A common notion is an idea of a property which is common to all things, and ‘those things which are common to all and which are equally in a part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately’ (E 2, 39). Another sense in which these notions are common is that they are possessed by all human beings since all individuals share the common nature they express. Natural science is premised upon ideas of this second level; these ideas are the foundation for the publicity of human knowledge, making it possible to redeem the liberatory claims of philosophic reason.

The means obtaining genuine scientific knowledge (Ratio), by ascending to the second level of knowledge (cognitio secundi generis), are provided by passive, unreflecting, common-sense experience and knowledge since some ‘adequate’ ideas must necessarily be formed alongside the ideas of the imagination through mind continuously reflecting the modifications of the body in the course of ordinary experience. The universal and all-pervasive features of extended Nature must be reflected in our ideas since all bodies are modes of Extension, and all minds are ideas of these modes of extension. Thus, whilst many of the ideas passively received by the mind at the first level of knowledge are reflections of the particular modifications of a particular finite mode, and are therefore confused and partial, they must also in part reflect the universal properties of Extension. All human beings therefore possess the elements of adequate knowledge: 

These things which are common to everything, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except in an adequate manner. Hence it follows that some ideas or notions exist which are common to all men; for all bodies agree in some things, and those things are bound to be conceived by all in an adequate manner, that is, clearly and distinctly. There will then exist in the human mind an adequate idea of properties which are common to the human body and any external bodies by which the human body is generally affected, and are present equally in the parts and in the whole of them.

E Pt II Prop XXXVII, Coroll and Prop XXXIX

These ideas which are common to all human beings are ‘common notions’ (notions communes) and are the foundations of scientific knowledge (fundamenta rationis) and of our genuine reasoning (ratiocinii nostri fundamenta). The objects of such ideas, their ideata, are those properties which any mode of extension or any body, or any part of one, necessarily possesses merely in virtue of being a mode of Extension. Whereas the universal notions are constituted by a confused mixture of logically unrelated ideas, the common notions impose themselves as logically necessary to the conception of extended things as such. Common notions and universal notions are therefore quite distinct.

‘A common notion is an ‘adequate’ idea, clearly and distinctly conceived; it is the mark of an adequate idea that, as soon as presented, it conveys certainty; for it represents something which, in the logically necessary constitution of the universe, could not be otherwise. Therefore it provides in itself a standard of certainty and self-evidence by comparison with which all other ideas and judgements can be assessed as claims to genuine knowledge. Since we all, in the course of common experience, necessarily acquire such common notions and adequate ideas, we must all possess a standard by which we can discriminate genuine knowledge from the confused and uncertain judgements of uncritical common sense. This doctrine – that all men necessarily know the distinction between logically necessary propositions, which are certainly true, and propositions which can logically be conceived to be false – is fundamental in Spinoza’s philosophy. Upon this doctrine he rests his claim that a study of philosophy, which includes the theory of knowledge, is essential to morality and happiness, and his claim that philosophy, which teaches us the right direction of the understanding, has a practical and moral function’ (Hampshire 1951:96).
Spinoza’s claim here – the ambition of his philosophy – redeems the fundamental ambition of philosophy in demonstrating the connection of reason and freedom. Spinoza affirms the possibility of banishing confused and inadequate ideas from the mind through all human beings necessarily having adequate ideas or clear and distinct conceptions, and, further, being capable of recognising them as adequate, clear and distinct. All human beings are, potentially and actually (latently) philosophers. The possibility of developing a method of right reasoning presumes that human beings necessarily realise that they have genuine knowledge when they have it. To develop and apply the method of right reasoning is necessarily to have ideas of ideas, and therefore to have ‘reflexive knowledge’ (cognitio reflexiva). In acquiring the method, human beings learn the power of clear thinking so that a true idea becomes the norm in all thinking. 

The mind, by acquiring an ever-increasing stock of clear ideas or knowledge, eo ipso acquires fresh ‘instruments’ to facilitate its progress. For it results from what has been said that there must exist in us, first of all and before everything else, a true idea – the innate instrument, as it were, of our intellectual advance; and that the first part of the method consists in reflecting upon this initial true idea, in forming a true idea of it…

On the Correction of the Understanding, Section VII para 39

Applied to logically necessary propositions, Descartes’ method of doubt is a logical impossibility. ‘Truth is the criterion of itself and of the false, as light reveals itself and darkness’. ‘He who has a true idea, knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing’. ‘Truth is its own standard’ (E Pt II Prop XLIII and Note). To Spinoza, forming a true idea is also to have a self-evident and logically necessary proposition; its truth cannot therefore be doubted. This self-evidence and logical necessity is the guarantee of truth and there is no better guarantee in principle. ‘If I have knowledge which is genuine knowledge, in the sense that the contradictory of what I know is logically inconceivable, I necessarily know that I know’. (Hampshire 151:100).

In ascending to the third and highest level of knowledge, the argument proceeds to a qualified form of the coherence theory of truth. Spinoza’s main metaphysical premise – God or Nature as single, unique substance revealed in the two attributes of Thought and Extension – requires the coherence theory of truth in some form.
Spinoza defines an ‘adequate idea’ as ‘an idea which contains in itself all the intrinsic marks or properties of a true idea, so far, as it is considered in itself without relation to its object’ (E Pt II Def IV). Spinoza explains: ‘I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement (convenientia) between the idea and its object (ideatum)’. This means that an adequate idea reflects the essence or real nature or defining properties of its object or ideatum.

‘The problem of method in constructing genuine scientific knowledge, avoiding error and uncertainty in the construction, is one of finding analysis the simple ideas from which it is possible to deduce the whole order of adequate ideas, arranging ideas in ‘the order of the intellect’ (ordo intellectus)’.

In fine, Spinoza delineates three levels of cognition. ‘Cognition of the first kind is the only cause of falsity’, whereas ‘cognition of the second and third kinds is necessarily true’ (E 2, 41). It follows that the truth of an idea derives not simply from its extrinsic correspondence with its ideatum but from its logical connexion to the system of ‘adequate’ ideas. Spinoza’s third and highest level of knowledge is intuition or scientia intuitive. ‘This kind of cognition proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ (E 2, 40, Scholium). This level is an ideal of rational knowledge. An intuition comes to us only when the relation between the subject of study and an ‘adequate idea of the formal essence of God’ is grasped. ‘Formal essence’ refers to the real and independent nature of God. Ascending the levels yields an advancement of knowledge through the progressive replacement of confused and inadequate ideas with adequate ideas so that, at the limit of apprehension, all thought follows inexorably from an adequate idea of the essence of God.

The adequacy and truth of ideas depends corresponds to the degree of comprehensiveness of the logical system of which they are a part. Only ‘intuitive knowledge’ (scientia intuitive) of the highest level reveals an absolutely true and adequate idea of the single all-inclusive substance God/Nature; all knowledge is evaluated in its approximation to this intuitive appreciation of a single system of ideas revealing the necessary parts of the structure of the Universe as a whole. Thus true freedom for Spinoza is the intellectual recognition of the thoroughgoing causal necessity that governs both the ‘order of things’ and the ‘order of ideas’. In so far as ‘inadequate’ concepts obstruct the attainment of this knowledge, human beings continue to equate freedom with the imaginary and confused (and therefore false) notion of the self-caused, autonomous, free-willing agent.
 
Within Spinoza’s metaphysics, the human mind cannot be a free agent since the mind consists of ideas of the modifications of the body, which is a finite mode; the order in which ideas occur is determined by logical necessity within the order of Nature. With genuine scientific knowledge, ideas reflect this order of causes in Nature as a whole. In so far as the mind consists of clear and distinct ideas deduced from ‘common notions’, ideas reflect this necessary causal order; in so far as the mind consists of the confused perceptions of senses and memory and of the mere passive association of ideas, imagination deludes human beings into striving after freedom equated with autonomy and will. Not only is it impossible to conceive of the individual as a free agent, there is a real sense in which agency cannot exist in Spinoza’s philosophical system. The extent to which Spinoza’s system implies a complete determinism needs to be addressed. For Spinoza is clearly connecting human freedom with the mind’s transition from a passive to an active mode in relation to God/Nature – in other words, there is creative agency of a kind that makes a difference within the Universe. In the peculiar sense given by Spinoza’s philosophy, the appreciation of the logically necessary order of God and Nature, human beings appreciating their part within the all-inclusive totality, yields freedom.

The kind of knowledge which the mind possesses is necessarily linked with the power of the body to be affected by changes in extended Nature (E Pt II, Prop XIV and Dem); mental capacity and physical capacity refer to the same power conceived under two different attributes. This connexion contains the clue as to why freedom and necessity are linked in Spinoza; by not appreciating the necessity of causal order within God/Nature, human beings are enslaved to and deluded by illusory or imaginary ideas; adequate ideas enable human beings to locate their proper place within God/Nature. Ordinary language implies that scientific knowledge or philosophical understanding can be expanded by an effort of will and attention without physical structure changing.

The attainment of absolutely complete knowledge by the individual mind – knowledge of the highest grade (scientia intuitiva) – implies that the individual body reflects the causal order in extended Nature as a whole. Such an individual would cease to be a person or finite mode, and instead become identical with God or Nature. 

It would be a mistake to understand Spinoza as arguing that the knowledge that each human being has derives from a particular subordinate position occupied in the scheme of Nature that is given and cannot be altered by an effort of will. Spinoza’s freedom depends upon human beings knowing the difference between the alterable and the unalterable in the system of Nature. Spinoza shows how human beings, by adopting the method of right reasoning and disciplining the mind, can correct the understanding and acquire ideas of ideas (cognitio reflexiva) that have practical effect and use. Spinoza stands firmly in the rationalist tradition dating from Plato and Aristotle in affirming philosophy to be a practical guide to human freedom. This is made clear in his introduction to Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding:





The greatest possible human perfection – the only freedom and happiness possible – is conditional upon human beings attaining the highest grade of knowledge. The important point to understand is that such attainment is possible since all science and knowledge include the common notions; this at least is guaranteed since the body, as a finite mode of Extension, must present to mind those intuitively self-evident propositions which reflect the essential features common to all modes of Extended substance. All human beings have glimpses of perfect knowledge and hence of what scientia intuitiva would be.

 Further, these self-evident or logically indubitable propositions give each individual a standard or norm of necessary truth and genuine knowledge with which to discern genuine knowledge as against ‘vague experience’ and irrational and subjective opinion. All men are philosophers, Gramsci wrote. It is in this assumption that the possibility of turning Plato’s singular notion of the Philosopher Ruler into the democratic notion of the Rule of Philosophy.  Human beings do not need to be taught what genuine knowledge is given that all necessarily possess some specimens of genuine knowledge and necessarily recognise them as such. Objective truth and logical certainty are intrinsic to human beings. The philosopher, in distinguishing the different levels of knowledge, merely makes explicit what human beings already implicitly recognise. 

The problems begin when relating Spinoza’s ambition to his system. The question concerns the extent to which the individual can achieve change and improvement through the free choice of the intellectual method; can individuals free themselves by the art of clear thinking? Spinoza addresses this very point:





Through the deliberate adoption of and adherence to a way of life and a discipline, human beings can improve understanding. Effort can make a difference. The Ethics makes genuine scientific knowledge the indispensable condition for any effort of this kind.

‘Although he (perhaps) cannot argue that, in studying his theory of knowledge, we are provided with the means of choosing the right way to live as free men, we are at least provided thereby with the means of distinguishing between freedom and servitude. His metaphysics and dependent theory of knowledge are designed to show man’s place in nature as a  thinking being, Spinoza always arguing that, until this is understood, nothing can be said about the nature and possibility of human happiness and freedom. Ethics without metaphysics must be nonsense; we must first know what our potentialities are and what our situation is as parts of Nature; otherwise anything we say about human purposes and happiness must be relatively subjective; our statements will be no more than a projection of the desires and imaginations generated in us by our particular confined experience as finite modes in Nature. Only in so far as we somehow come to understand ourselves and our actual and possible purposes sub specie aeternitatis, that is, as necessary consequences of our situation within Natura Naturata, can we lay down moral propositions which are objectively valid’ (Hampshire 1951:115).

‘These problems are compounded by the existence of two radically opposed interpretive traditions, the one (mainly German and English) regarding Spinoza as a visionary thinker in the high Romantic line of descent, the other (mainly French) treating him as a thoroughgoing materialist and a strong precursor to Marxism, semiotics, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and other such contemporary movements of thought (p31 16). If one thing is clear it is the fact that Spinoza made the highest possible claims for the pure good of theory, its power to demystify false ideas, bring the mind to an acceptance of truths unavailable through ‘bodily’ or commonsense perception, and thus achieve a knowledge atop all the strife of competing creeds and ideologies’ (Norris 31).

‘It is precisely this aspect of Spinoza’s system that has struck many readers as a species of idealist or metaphysical delusion, the result of his assuming a direct correspondence between the order of ideas (or rational thought) and the order of real-world events, processes, causal relations, etc. For it is a truth self-evident to reason, on Spinoza’s account, that ‘the idea of each caused thing depends on the cognition of the cause of which it is the effect’ (E II, P 7). In which case there could be no question of our having an ‘adequate idea’ that would not correspond to some real-world state of affairs. Truth would be its own guarantee in the sense that our knowledge (or the structure of logical relations between one idea and another) provided the only possible means by which to conceptualise reality. Thus ‘substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through another’ (E II, P 7 note). Hence Spinoza’s radical monism and, following from this, his espousal of a thoroughly deterministic outlook that identifies truth with the inexorable order of causal necessity, and freedom with the willing acceptance of this same condition. To many later thinkers (including Kant) this appeared nothing more than a striking example of the errors to which philosophy was prone when it exceeded the bounds of cognitive grasp and lost itself in the realm of pure speculative reason. Spinoza’s mistake – and that of all rationalist metaphysics – was to think that one could gain a direct, unmediated knowledge of reality without first establishing the powers and limits of human understanding.
 Such was Kant’s object in the first Critique: to demonstrate the confusions that arise when these limits are ignored, when speculation is given free rein, and when ‘ideas of pure reason’ are allowed to override the evidence of phenomenal cognition (32 17). It was essential to maintain this distinction, he believed, since otherwise there could be no defence against the arguments of sceptics like Hume, those who had rejected the rationalist appeal to a necessary link between the ‘order of ideas’ and the ‘order of things’, and who then went on to deny the possibility of our ever giving reasons (or validating grounds) for even the most basic items of commonsense knowledge. Kant’s answer was that these problems were wholly misconceived, and that Hume’s radical scepticism was merely the obverse of Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism. Henceforth philosophy should concern itself not with ontological questions (‘what is the nature of reality?’) but with questions concerning the ‘conditions of possibility’ for knowledge in general, the a priori grounds for different kinds of truth-claim, and the legitimate scope of those various faculties – pure reason, understanding, practical reason, aesthetic judgement – which between them comprised the entirety of human knowledge and experience. This would bring two main benefits, according to Kant. On the one hand it would show that metaphysicians (Spinoza among them) had fallen into error by ignoring the lesson of the first Critique, i.e. that if ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’, then equally ‘concepts without intuitions are empty’. And it would also avoid the determinist upshot of Spinoza’s arguments by showing the questions of free-will, autonomy or ethical choice are not properly dealt with by the same faculty – that of theoretical understanding – but need to be deduced from quite different principles, as enounced in the second Critique. Thus philosophy could be saved from the twin perils represented by Hume and Spinoza: an empiricism forced to entertain extravagant doubts about our knowledge of the external world, and a rationalism that led to the most extreme form of metaphysical determinist creed. The results of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy would be to establish once and for all the limits of pure (speculative) reason, and the necessity of referring all truth-claims to the appropriate tribunal, as decided through a process of transcendental-deductive critique’ (Norris 33).

5 FREEDOM AND MORALITY
Descartes had made the self or subject, whose existence was established by the cogito, the focal point of his reasoning. There is little more than a faint echo of this in Spinoza: ‘the first thing which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else that the idea of an individual thing actually existing’ (E 2, 11). Although Spinoza adopts as an axiom in Part 2 of the Ethics that ‘man thinks’, there is no self or subject in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. The ‘I’ which Descartes made the necessary bastion against doubt is absent. In the preface to the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy Spinoza is explicit that the cogito has no authority beyond ‘clear and distinct ideas’, and these represent the world sub specie aeternitatis, from the ‘point of view’ of God rather than the subject.
 Spinoza does recognise the existence of self-consciousness in that our ideas may be accompanied by ideas of themselves, and those ideas by ideas of them, and so on ad infinitum. Spinoza offers the proof that ‘the idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body’ (E 2, 21). That this proof makes no reference to self or subject indicates that Spinoza, consistent with the method of adequate ideas, is unable to insert the subjective element into his universe.

Descartes had defined the task of philosophy to be that of ascending from the subjective viewpoint of the ‘I’ to the ‘absolute conception’ of the world. Kant would later argue decisively that this elimination of the subject is neither possible nor desirable since the world is my world, stamped indelibly with the mark of self-consciousness. To Spinoza, however, the ‘absolute conception’ of the world is precisely what ‘adequate’ knowledge consists in and is therefore fundamental. This has profound ethical implications. Life is seen from the viewpoint not of an ‘I’ whose problems arise from individual circumstances but of a pure and disinterested reasoner, for whom the human individual is no more than a mode of God. This objective view of the world is literally and inherently ‘selfless’ and forms the basis of Spinoza’s moral exhortation that human beings will attain true freedom only by ascending from the illusory perspective which views things sub specie durationis to that absolute viewpoint which is God’s.

In ordinary life, viewing the world sub specie durationis, individuals are split between the demands of morality and the temptations of nature. This is the basis of the dualism between good and evil. Spinoza shows that this conflict is generated at the first level of knowledge. The dualism of reason and passion, bifurcating the individual between the ‘higher’ demands of morality and the base order of inclination, is a product of our confused opinions and can therefore be eliminated by an adequate idea of our nature. Spinoza shows how it is possible to realise the ‘higher’ ideals of morality without having to de-nature human beings, by realising nature. Words like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are to be explained, not by the truth of the ideas expressed in them, but by the emotions which their use conveys: ‘we strive towards, desire or long for nothing because we deem it to be good; but on the contrary, we deem a thing good because we strive, wish, desire or long for it’ (E 3, 9).

Spinoza resolves the problem of reconciling an evil world with a good creator, by arguing that the evils of the world are merely ‘privations’, partial modes of God which ‘express no essence’ (C XXIII, E 4, Preface). Things appear to be evil to the extent that they are unreal.
There would appear to be no role for moral philosophy given the way that Spinoza resolved the problem of evil. If the ideas of good and evil are arbitrary privations, and if everything that happens is alike part of divine nature, philosophy would seem to lack objective significance. Spinoza affirms, however, that it is still possible to objectively pose and objectively answer moral questions. Parts 3 and 4 of the Ethics show the influence of Aristotle. Aristotle and Spinoza share a philosophical anthropology in arguing that the ‘good life’ for human beings is defined not by the moral judgements of particular individuals, but objectively, by human nature. Spinoza shows that the good life for man is both objectively definable and rationally pursuable by going beyond passions to understand human nature as it really is, showing that our freedom and our happiness are one and the same. The words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are thus defined in technical terms with which to conduct a ‘geometrical’ investigation into human happiness: ‘by good, I understand that which we certainly know to be useful (utile) to us’; ‘by bad, however, I understand that which we certainly know will prevent us from partaking of any good’ (E 4, Def 1 and 2). The good life is that which is most ‘useful’ to – corresponds to the realisation of – human nature; the bad life is that which contradicts human nature. ‘Evil’ is to be avoided, not because it is subject to divine punishment, but because it is contrary to our nature and hence generates despair rather than happiness (C XXI).

Spinoza makes the moral philosopher a naturalist since human beings are a part of Nature. The ideally possible freedom and happiness of human beings, as well as their actual unfreedom and unhappiness, are objectively and impartially deduced and explained as the necessary consequences of the status of human beings as finite modes in Nature; exhortation stemming from emotion and desire is as ineffectual in moral philosophy as it is in natural science. Human beings cannot be other than what their nature makes them. The whole duty and wisdom of human beings is to understand fully their position in Nature and to acquiesce; this complete philosophical self-understanding issues in the greatest happiness and peace of mind (acquiescentia animi).
As finite modes within Nature, human beings, like all other particular things, preserve their identity only so long as a certain total distribution of motion and rest is preserved among the system of ultimate particles (corpora simplicissima) composing them. As relatively complex organisms, human beings can maintain their ‘actual essence’ as particular things through constant changes of state or modifications of their nature in interactions with their environment. The identity of all particular things in Nature logically depends on their power to maintain a constant distribution of energy in the system as a whole in spite of external causes. This tendency to self-maintenance constitutes any particular thing’s ‘actual essence’.

The endeavour (conatus) wherewith each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing more than the actual essence of the thing itself.

Ethics Proposition VII, Part III


The greater the power of self-maintenance of the particular thing in the face of constant change through interaction with the environment, the greater reality it has, and the more clearly it can be distinguished as possessing a definite nature and individuality.

Spinoza agrees with Hobbes’ view that individuals seek to extend their power and secure their own preservation but in Spinoza’s philosophy this involves much more than a truism of moral psychology stemming from observed facts. Spinoza’s point is a deduction from metaphysical first principles and applies to all finite things rather than peculiarly to human beings.

The human mind consists of ideas which reflect the effects of external causes in modifying that balance of motion and rest which constitutes the human body. The interaction of the body’s interaction with other things produces a modification which increases or diminishes energy within comparatively wide limits without the personality being destroyed. In mental terms these modifications can be defined as pleasure and pain so that every increase in vitality or energy is by definition necessarily a pleasure, and every diminution is necessarily a pain. Spinoza means by pleasure (Laetitia) ‘the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, and by pain (Tristitia) the passion by which it passes to a lower state of perfection’ (Ethics Pt III Prop XI, Note)/(E 3, 11). Any increase or decrease in the power or perfection of the body must also be an increase in the power or perfection of the mind and conversely; an increase or decrease in vitality or energy can be conceived indifferently in either mental or physical terms.

Spinoza affirms a distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ states of mind: ‘Our mind acts certain things and suffers others:  namely in so far as it has adequate ideas, thus far it necessarily acts certain things, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, thus far it necessarily suffers certain things’ (E Proposition I, Part 3). The distinction between doing certain things and suffering certain things is one of degree. The degree of power or perfection of any finite thing depends on the degree to which it is causally active or passive in relation to things. Only God or Nature as the full and originating cause of anything acts without being acted upon. God or Nature is active in all respects and passive in none and is therefore self-determining. Since none of the modifications of God or Nature can be the effects of external causes and since there can be no causes external to God or Nature, God or Nature is the one absolutely powerful and perfect.

Spinoza’s distinction between active and passive emotion derives directly from the epistemological distinction between imagination (inadequate ideas) and intellect (true and adequate ideas). The human being experiences an active emotion only if the idea which is the psychical accompaniment of the ‘affection’ is logically deducible from the previous idea constituting the mind. If the cause of the ‘affection’ is external to the human being, it follows that it involves an inadequate idea. The opposite must also be true. To claim that the cause of the modification is external to the human being is the same as claiming that it involves incomplete knowledge and an inadequate idea. In so far as the human being is a free agent, unaffected by external causes, s/he necessarily has adequate ideas or scientific knowledge; the opposite must also be true; only the intelligent human being can (logically) be free, and only the free human being can (logically) be intelligent. As finite modes, however, human beings cannot in principle be completely free and unaffected by external causes; human freedom must be a matter of degree. Spinoza’s method in the last three parts of the Ethics is to contrast the actual and normal conditions of human servitude with the humanly unattainable ideal of permanent and perfect freedom’ (137).

Finite modes like human beings form links in the infinite order of causality of the whole. Nevertheless, ‘in so far as’ the states of human beings are generated from the striving (conatus) that constitutes their nature, so far are they the cause of them and active in respect of them; ‘in so far as’ human beings are acted upon by external causes, are they the passive victims of processes which are outside of them and which they do not control. A finite mode has a greater power and perfection in so far as its successive states or modifications are the effects of changes generated within and less the effects of external causes. Thus the degree of power or perfection of a human being, conceived as a finite mode of Thought, varies in so far as the succession of ideas which constitute the mind are linked together as causes to effects; to the extent that the succession of ideas is a logical one the human being is active rather than passive; in so far as ideas which are the effects of external causes interrupt this autonomous process of thought, the human being has less power or perfection as a thinking being. The mind is active in so far as it is self-determining, freed from the influence of things of which it has no adequate idea. Human beings advance from the passive to the active state through coming to possess adequate ideas. ‘The power and perfection of an individual mind is increased in proportion as it becomes less passive and more active and self-contained in the production of ideas’ (Hampshire 1951:126). Spinoza proved that ‘ideas which are adequate in the mind of anyone are adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind’ (E 2, 11, Corollary).  Some effect must follow from any given idea, and an adequate idea is the adequate cause of all that issues from it. For this reason God is the full or adequate cause of things in having adequate ideas. And ‘in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause of’, and hence ‘necessarily acts’ certain things.

Human beings are active only in so far as they have an adequate idea of the process. Spinoza thus argues that ‘the actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, while passions depend upon inadequate ideas alone’ (E 3, 3).

Human beings may be wholly active in respect of processes which are not the product of human action: thus an individual falling from a tree is active in having an adequate idea of the process entailed; an individual who chops down the tree is passive in being ignorant of the universal laws of motion. Human beings have little acquaintance with complete actions except in the mathematical and philosophical reasoning, where ideas follow successfully with a logical and self-evident necessity.

The greater the adequacy of ideas, the greater the power and independence of human beings in relation to the world. Spinoza defines virtue in these terms: ‘by virtue (virtus) and power I understand the same thing’ (E 4, Def 8). Virtue is also perfection, and perfection and reality are one and the same. In human terms, virtue consists in the enhancement of the conatus through which human beings persist. Spinoza thus concludes that it is the nature of human beings to strive to increase their power; that this striving is the source of all pleasure; and that the process whereby this pleasure is obtained is the very same ‘improvement of the intellect’ that leads human beings to adequate ideas.

For Spinoza, moral exhortation or appeal through will and judgement concerning the pleasant or desirable is effectual only in being related to the natural and necessary tendency of the human organism to maintain and increase its own power and perfection. Desire and pleasure are natural states or modifications of the person which occur independently of will or judgment. ‘The mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. From which it comes about that the order of the concatenation of things is a single order, whether Nature is conceived under one or the other attribute; it follows therefore that the order of the actions and passions of our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind.. Now all these things clearly show that the decision of the mind, together with the appetite and determination of the body, are simultaneous in nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the attribute of thought and explained in terms of it, we call decision, and when considered under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest, we call determination (determinatio)…’ (E Part III Prop II Note). The human being, regarded as a body, is stimulated or depressed in vitality or energy by contact with other particular things; the point is that Spinoza explains this ‘determination’ completely by purely physical laws and in terms of physical equilibrium.

Such physical explanation seems incapable of grasping the ‘higher’ actions and achievements of human history, in art, architecture, literature etc; can human ambitions and purposes be reduced to physical causes? To those who would argue the need to distinguish between the higher activities of the mind and the more simple functioning of the body, Spinoza argues:

No one has so far determined what the body is capable of, that is,  no one has yet been taught by experience what the body is capable of doing merely from the laws of Nature alone, in so far as Nature is considered as purely physical nature, and what it cannot do, unless determined by the mind. For no one has acquired such accurate knowledge of the fabric of the body, as to be able to explain all its functions; nor need I omit to mention the many things observed in brutes, which far surpass human sagacity, and the many things which sleep-walkers do, which they would not dare to do when awake: this is sufficient to show that the body itself, merely from the laws of its own nature alone, can do many things, at which the mind marvels/

E Pt III Prop II Note

This means that there are no grounds for excluding a priori the possibility of physical explanation of any part of human behaviour, no matter how high and exalted it appears, since such an exclusion proceeds from ignorance as to the full capability of the human body.

In conceiving the possibility of complete causal explanation of human behaviour, Spinoza reveals that it follows logically that all human individuals necessarily pursue their own pleasure in accordance with the necessary laws of Nature and not in the sense of moral deliberation and choice over which course of action realises the greater pleasure; behaviour is explained not by moral choice but as arising from the conatus of the organism, its tendency to self-maintenance and self-preservation.

Spinoza understands pleasure, pain and desire to be the primary passions in terms of which all the other passions or emotions are to be defined. In so far as they arise from the passive association of ideas, as in ordinary life, they are by definition ‘confused’ perceptions. In experiencing these passions, the mind is not aware of the causes of its ideas. Conscious life thus proceeds at the level of sense-perception and imagination rather than at the level of logical thought or active intellect; human beings are merely reacting to external causes.

The ideas accompanying these modifications of the body ‘indicate the actual constitution of our own body rather than that of the external bodies’ (E Pt II Prop XVI Coroll). But they do not exhibit the nature of our own bodies or the nature of external bodies adequately, in their proper place in the order of causes in nature.

Spinoza grounds his ethics in a ‘natural history’ of man that is derived entirely deductively from premises deemed to be necessarily true. Spinoza emphasises the originality of his approach:





Spinoza’s metaphysics therefore affirm the possibility of a geometry of the passions which yields self-knowledge by regarding ‘human actions and desires precisely as though I were dealing with lines, planes and bodies’ (E 3, Preface). Spinoza therefore proposes to by treat the emotions (affectiones) exactly as he had treated of God. Spinoza defines emotions (affectus) thus:





This definition conceives emotion to be a form of understanding in which, however confused, a greater or lesser ‘activity’ of the mind might be expressed: ‘inasmuch as the essence of the mind consists in this (2, 11 and 13), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and as we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows, therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it happens to affirm something confirming its body, or some part of it, which involves more or less reality than before’ (E 3, Appendix). This means that the ‘mental act’ behind every passion may express a greater or less mental perfection, reality, power since these are all one and the same in Spinoza’s metaphysics and hence are equivalent to the ‘adequacy’ of ideas in their mental aspect. Emotions, therefore, range according to the ‘adequacy’ of the idea involved in them. At one end is passion, in which the mind is the victim of processes which it does not understand or control; at the other end is the serene contemplation of the truth of things through which the mind asserts its perfection and its power. Ascending from passion to action achieves the ‘emendation’ of the passions so that the intellect gains ascendancy over the confused material of the imagination. Thus, ‘an emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it’ (E 5, 3); thus ‘the more an emotion becomes known to us, the more it is within our power, and the less the mind is passive to it’ (E 5, 3 Corollary). As Spinoza argues: ‘the more an effect is known to us, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it’; or again that ‘an affect which is a passion [i.e. both passive and confused] ceases to be one as soon as we conceive a clear and distinct idea of it’ (E V, P 3c & E V, P 3 cited by Donagan p186).

the true cognition we have of good and evil is only abstract or universal, and the judgement which we make about the order of things and the connection of causes, in order that we may be able to determine what in the present is good and evil for us, is imaginary rather than real.

E IV, P 62s. 

This argument indicates the possibility of identifying in the Ethics a reasonable model of human self-knowledge, motivation and desire which connects Spinoza’s metaphysics with a philosophical anthropology.
 
Spinoza’s catalogue of the emotions and the way that he analyses them in terms of pleasure, pain and desire demonstrates that the emotions can be understood and interpreted on his premises, and as ultimately arising from the conatus, the tendency to self-preservation, which is common to all things in Nature, human or inhuman. Further, the catalogue details the varieties of human servitude and unreason (E Pt III Prop LIX Note).

The transition from the ordinary life ruled by passive emotion and confused ideas to the free life of active emotion and adequate ideas is to be achieved by making individuals conscious of the struggle to preserve internal adjustment and balance, expressing natural energy or  conatus. Virtue and vice vary in necessary connection in this scenario according to pleasure and pain. Spinoza presents an original version of Plato’s thesis that ‘virtue is its own reward’. Spinoza is concerned to distinguish pleasure (laetitia) in his sense of the total well-being and efficiency of the organism from mere local stimulations which, although ordinarily equated with pleasure, are merely temporary and partial; Spinoza calls these ‘titillation’ (titillatio).

This means that the increasing knowledge and understanding of Nature, with the recognition that human beings are a part of Nature, causes human beings to discard the notion of freedom as choice and will. To understand the cause of some event is to understand the grounds from which the occurrence of the event could be logically deduced; since these grounds form part of God or Nature as a single and all-encompassing deductive system conceived under the attribute of thought, these grounds can be demonstrated to follow necessarily from some higher-order premises. Increases in knowledge shows every human action to be necessary links in the infinite chain of causes. ‘Men think themselves free, and in so far as they are conscious of their volitions and desire, and are ignorant of the causes by which they are disposed to will and desire…’ As finite modes within Nature, individuals can be free only to the extent that they recognise that their actions are caused; they appear to be ‘free’ in the sense that their actions are uncaused or self-determined only in a superstitious sense i.e. to those ignorant of causes.

‘Spinoza, alone of the great figures of that age, seems somehow to have anticipated modern conceptions of the scale of the universe, and of man’s relatively infinitesimal place within the vast system; in Descartes and in Leibniz, and in most of the literature of the age, one is still in various ways given the impression of a universe in which human beings on this earth are the privileged centre around whom everything is arranged, almost, as it were, for their benefit; whatever their professed doctrine, almost everyone still implicitly thought in terms of a man-centred universe, although Pascal also, in some moments of conflict, had this inhuman vision of human beings as not especially significant or distinguished parts of an infinite system, which seems in itself vastly more worthy of respect and attention than any of our transitory interests and adventures. To Spinoza it seemed that men can attain happiness and dignity only by identifying themselves, through their knowledge and understanding, with the whole order of nature, and by submerging their individual interests in this understanding. I suggest that it is this aspect of Spinoza’s naturalism, the surviving spirit of Lucretius against a greater background of knowledge, which most shocked and baffled his contemporaries and successors, and which seemed the most ‘hideous’ feature of ‘the hideous hypothesis’ (Hampshire 1951:161).

6 WISDOM AND THE LIFE OF THE FREE MAN

Although Spinoza demonstrates the extent to which the emotional life human beings is, in the natural course of things, concealed in its dependence upon bodily history, so that human beings are subjects of unconscious forces, he reveals that this condition is neither inevitable nor permanent. Human beings are able to render conscious that which is presently unconscious by an effort of self-understanding; in the process of attaining an active mode of mentality, human beings gain mastery of a fate that is their own.

In arguing that human happiness and freedom consists in the constant increase of power, Spinoza rejects Christian morality; Spinoza condemns not only hatred, envy, contempt, and rage, but also pity and humility as weaknesses which have no place in the life of a superior being (E 5, 50, 53).
In its worldly aspect, Spinoza’s positive morality involves the disciplined emendation of the passions and is Aristotelian in character. Spinoza’s proofs therefore reaffirm the central tenets of Aristotle’s virtue theory, arguing that ‘self-complacency [acquiescentia in se ipso] is the highest object for which we can hope’ (E 4, 52), and  that ‘honour is not repugnant to reason but may arise from it’ (E 4, 58). In its religious or contemplative aspect, Spinoza’s philosophy is more Platonic and recalls neo-Platonic morality in its spirit of renunciation.

Spinoza argues ‘that thing is said to be free [libera] which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone’ (E Part I Definition 7). Only God or Nature is free; human action is ‘compelled’ in stemming from the divine nature (i.e. from an ‘external cause’). God or Nature has the power to produce its own modifications without reference to an ‘external cause’; therefore the  freedom of God or Nature is identical with its power. The idea of freedom can be extended to finite modes like human individuals. ‘In so far as’ [quatenus] human beings are the ‘adequate’ causes of their actions, they produce them without the aid of an external cause, and thus to that extent free. To the extent that the mind is occupied with adequate ideas, human beings approximate to this state of self-dependence. The emendation of the passions that leads human beings to an adequate conception of the world realises freedom in the sense of having power over our own situation, implying the recognition of necessity as against freedom from necessity: ‘man can be called free only in so far as he has the power to exist and act in accordance with the laws of human nature’ (E 4, 24); this means ‘to seek and find understanding’ (T xvi, P ii, 11). Spinoza explicitly rejects the equation of freedom with the ideas of ‘contingency’ and ‘possibility’; these are ‘defects of our intellect’ that prevent human beings from understanding real aspects (M 1, iii, section 9; E 1, 33, Scholium 1):

I call individual things contingent in so far as, while we regard their essence alone, we find nothing which imposes their existence necessarily, or which necessarily excludes it. I call the same individual things possible in so far as while we regard the causes by which they must be produced, we know not whether they are determined to produce them.

E 4, Definitions 3 and 4

The ordinary idea of human freedom belongs to the first level of knowledge and expresses ignorance:





Ideas of possibility and contingency diminish as knowledge of the causality of actions increases. This knowledge of causality is not the negation of freedom but is its condition. Ideas of possibility and contingency arise from imagination in the passive state of mind; this is the illusory idea of freedom and entails human bondage rather than freedom. The more knowledge of causality increases so that human beings, through adequate ideas, understand the necessary, the more do they have power over them, and so the more human beings are free (E 5, 6). Freedom is the recognition of necessity and not freedom from necessity; human beings, through their reason, their activity of mind, are ‘in control’ in the same way that the mind is wholly determined by logical necessity in a mathematical proof. Freedom conceived as freedom from logical necessity is no value (C XXI).

Human beings are free in so far as they have a clear and distinct idea of the causes of the causes of their physical and mental states. To obtain this adequate knowledge of causality necessarily involves a more complete knowledge of God or Nature as a whole. ‘In so far as’ the knowledge of Nature increases, human beings recognise themselves as parts of Nature and necessarily cease to be in any way affected by the particular things and persons and cease to desire, love and hate them since they arise by the association of ideas through ignorance of the true causes of our pleasures and pains. The free and wise human being feels morally and emotionally neutral towards the particular things and persons around him, in understanding why they are what they are and could not be otherwise, overcoming the ignorance that views them as the true causes of pleasures and pains. The pleasures of the free person must be generated spontaneously, through the full awareness of free activity, rather than as the effects of external causes. The greater the real activity and vitality of the body, the greater the real activity and vitality of the mind; and conversely. ‘In so far as’ a human being is functioning freely, unaffected by external causes, the person will necessarily be in a state of pleasure (laetitia), this pleasure being the reflexion of the vitality of the whole person. The wise and free person will avoid pain and aim necessarily ‘to act well and to rejoice’ (‘bene agere ac laetari’). To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well. Spinoza repudiates as unnatural the virtues of asceticism, self-sacrifice and self-denial and the Christian virtues of humility, repentance, and remorse; ‘there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but melancholy is always bad’ (E Pt IV Prop XLII). Pain, and the painful emotions such as hatred, envy, fear necessarily indicate weakness and exhibit the lack of freedom in being reflexions of some inhibition of vitality as a result of external causes. The free or intelligent person’s life is characterised by pleasure as conscious well-being and enjoyed activity as distinct from particular pleasures in the limited sense of titillatio and which, to excess, as disturb the balance and well-being of the whole organism.

Spinoza identifies virtue in the natural terms of sanity and health. From this naturalist perspective the Christian virtues of suffering, guilt, and remorse are morbid symptoms of insanity and ill-health. The increase in knowledge and intelligence is necessarily good in increasing human power and freedom, and is to be pursued in the interests of self-preservation; anything which obstructs knowledge and intelligence diminishes the freedom and vitality of the individual and is self-destructive. This has political implications; The free individual has therefore every interest in upholding the necessary conventions of a peaceful society in order to restrain social and political instability and personal rivalries within legally binding rules and institutions. This enables the independence and detachment required for the free exercise of understanding in the pursuit of knowledge. Far from being competitive, free individuals require from others respect for law and order in the interests of peacefulness and have a positive interest in promoting the happiness and intellectual emancipation of all. Conflicts of interest within society necessarily arise in so far as individuals are governed by passive emotions and these conflicts threaten the self-preservation of the individual and the self-advancement in knowledge. The enlightened and the free person must therefore work to emancipate his fellow citizens from superstition and ignorance and from the conflicts which such a passive state engenders. 

Whatever helps to maintain the common society of men, or whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement, is useful, and, on the other hand, what produces discord in the state, is bad.

E Pt IV Prop XL

The happy, wise and free person (to claim one of these titles implies the possession of the others) cannot hate and fear others and returns love for hatred, rage and contempt with love; the happy, wise and free person that just as hatred is increased by being reciprocated, so too is love. The free person is a true philosopher in being unaffected by fear and hope, and in rejecting the imaginations of jealous personal Gods allotting rewards and punishments characterising the anthropomorphic religions. Since the best life is necessarily the happiest life, the free person knows that ‘virtue is its own reward’. The free person therefore acts well naturally according to the supreme inner satisfaction which arises from a rational peace of mind rather in response to the supernatural bribes of hope of an afterlife or the fear of punishments which characterise conventional religion. The individual acts according to internal natural rather than external sanction.

In being conscious of necessity, the free person is unaffected by hope and fear, ignorance and superstition and in consequence avoids the negativity of hatred, envy, contempt and other passive emotions. In Spinoza’s positive morality, the free person knows that virtue is power, that power is freedom, and that freedom is happiness. ‘A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life’ (E 4, 17). The blessedness of the individual consists in the serene contemplation of God or Nature as a whole, bound in community with others of like mind, by ‘the love which acknowledges as its cause freedom of mind’ (E 4, Appendix).

Spinoza argues that: ‘A free man, that is, one who lives according to the dictate of reason alone, is not led by the fear of death’ (E Pt IV Prop LXIII), but directly desires what is good (Coroll of same Prop), that is, to act, to live, and preserve his being on the basis of seeking what is useful (E Pt IV Prop XXIV). Therefore ‘A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life’ (E Pt IV Prop LXXII Dem). The free person is wholly absorbed in the development and exercise of the powers of mind and body, and is always aware of being a finite mode of Nature. The more that knowledge increases, individuals are less affected by passive emotions, and the more closely the order of the person’s ideas approximate the order of ideas which constitute knowledge of the processes of God or Nature. The free person progressively ceases to be a particular person interested or affected by particular things, interacting with a particular environment, and comes instead to view all things sub specie aeternitatis. The true happiness (beatitudo) of the individual consists in this contemplation of the whole system of God or Nature.

In pursuing self-preservation and happiness, the free person removes every obstacle to the development of the understanding; this requires relations of mutual aid and friendship in an ordered community of active citizens as disinterested philosopher-scientists bound together by ‘the love which acknowledges as its cause freedom of mind’ (E Pt IV Appendix, Section XIX). Nevertheless, the imperfection which always characterises the human condition means that this community is an ideal to promote and strive for; in the meantime, the free person sustains the compromise system of law and punishment, which would be unnecessary if human beings could be perfectly wise. The wise person remains a human being, and therefore is by definition not perfect or all-powerful; the human individual cannot be wholly free, rational and self-contained.

Human power is greatly limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and therefore we do not have absolute power of adapting things which are outside for our use. But we shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us and which are contrary to what our interest demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty and cannot extend our actual power to such an extent as to avoid these things, and further, that we are a part of Nature as a whole, and we follow its order. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is called our understanding or intelligence, that is, the best part in us, will entirely acquiesce in this, and will strive to persist in this acquiescence. For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing other than what is necessary, and we cannot entirely acquiesce in anything other than the truth.

Ethics Pt IV Appendix XXXII

The free person resolutely sees reality as it is and takes an active pleasure in understanding the infinite concatenation of causes. This exhibits the characteristic virtues of strength of mind (fortitudo) and nobility (generositas). Nobility is a form of disinterestedness and as a rational disdain of particular interests and of petty worldly calculations savours a great deal of Aristotle’s supreme virtue of magnificence. Although many have compared Spinoza’s ethics to Stoicism, Spinoza is at pains to distinguish the free person’s virtue of strength of mind from the virtues of stoicism. Spinoza’s strength of mind is quite distinct from the Stoic exercise of will in being the intellectual recognition of facts without the intrusion of subjective fears and hopes, impassively, without sentiment; it is the intellectual virtue of attaining acquiescence, objectivity, in face of rationally ascertained truth. This is to achieve eternal life through the intellectual love of God or Nature: ‘he who understands himself and his emotions loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions’ (E 5, 15). Arising necessarily from the pursuit of knowledge, this delineates an intellectual love (amor intellectualis Dei) through activity of mind. Such a mind rejoices constantly in the object of its contemplation. God is without emotion and can experience neither passion nor pleasure nor pain (E 5, 17). God neither loves the good nor hates the wicked (C XXIII): indeed God loves and hates no one (E 5, 17, Corollary). Hence ‘he who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return’ (E 5, 19). The intellectual love of God or Nature is wholly disinterested, and ‘cannot be polluted by an emotion either of envy or jealousy, but is cherished the more, the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love’ (E 5, 20). Indeed, the intellectual love of God ‘is the very love of God with which God loves himself’ (E 5, 36). Through this love of God human beings participate in the impersonal, universal love that reigns in the divine intellect: for God loves human beings as a self-love in and through men and this eternal love constitutes our ‘salvation, blessedness or liberty’.

The ‘intellectual love of God’ is the highest form of philosophic wisdom.
Whilst the ‘intellectual love of God’ implies a purely spiritual, other-worldly contemplation quite detached from the material world, there is a need to remember that by God Spinoza also means ‘Nature’. To gain further sense of Spinoza’s meaning one needs also to write the phrase as the ‘intellectual love of Nature’. Since God or Nature is a single substance, understanding any particular part of it is necessarily to understand more of the whole. It follows that in the process of coming to understand themselves and the causes of their states and reactions, human beings necessarily come to understand more of Nature as a whole. Spinoza has been described as a mystical pantheist of account of equating God or Nature and his description of the good life as ‘the intellectual love of God’; in truth, Spinoza’s conclusions are rigorously deduced from logical and metaphysical premises. 
Whatever poets and mystics may read into it, Spinoza’s ‘Intellectual love of God’ possesses a precise meaning which Spinoza concisely explains in Proposition XXIV of Part V of the Ethics. ‘The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God’. To understand God is to understand Nature as self-creating and self-created. The third and highest level of intuitive knowledge reveals every individual detail of the natural world to be related to the whole structure of Nature. It follows from this that human beings, in coming to develop an intellectual love of God, become philosophical naturalists in gaining pleasure through tracing in detail the order of natural causes.
This is to understand the human individual, the self, to be a finite mode within Nature, significant only in so far as the individual transcends this condition as a finite and perishing existence by re-creating in the mind some part of the self-creative activity of Nature. This is achieved only in so far as the individual is interested only in Nature, in the system of things as they are, with all particular desires or passive emotions subordinated to this interest. Spinoza sought to prove that reason was the way to freedom and that to be rational is necessarily to love God. As the individual comes to understand the causes of the desires, loves and hates to which they are subject, these are necessarily transformed into the intellectual love of God. Spinoza also sought to prove that, the more the interests of human individuals are purely intellectual so that emotions become purely active emotions, the more individuals come to appreciate what they have in common with each other, and the more, therefore, the possibility of conflict between individuals is diminished.
 Spinoza deduces the possibility of eternity of the human mind from his definitions. To understand what Spinoza means by ‘eternity’ there is a need to recognise the fundamental distinction between the infinite and the finite on which his whole metaphysics rests.

By Eternity I understand existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the mere definition of an eternal thing. For the existence of a thing, as an eternal truth, is conceived to be the same as its essence, and therefore cannot be explained by duration of time, although a duration may be conceived to be without beginning or end.

E Pt I Def VIII and Expl

Nature is presented  sub specie aeternitatis; Nature must be understood, not as a temporal sequence of events, but as a logical sequence of necessarily connected modifications.

All ideas exist in God and are modifications of God’s thought. Some ideas also exist in the human mind. It follows, as Spinoza argues, that the ideas of human individuals exist in God in so far as [quatenus] God constitutes the human mind. Conversely, since God has adequate knowledge of everything, the ideas of human individuals are adequate in so far as they share in the infinite intellect. The more adequate the conceptions of individuals, the more they reach beyond their finite condition to the divine essence of which they are a mode.
Since God is eternal and outside of time and change, ‘things are conceived as actual in two ways – either in so far as they exist in relation to a certain time and place, or in so far as we conceive them as contained in God, and following from the necessity of the divine nature’ (E 5, 29 Scholium). To pass from the human to the divine is to pass from time to the timeless. Thus ‘it is the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain aspect of eternity [sub quadam aeternitatis specie] (E 2, 44, Corollary 2). An adequate conception of the world is a conception sub specie aeternitatis; that is how God sees the world (with which God is identical). Human individuals see the world this way only in so far as our minds participate in the vision which is God’s as a pure rational intelligence which transcends all contingent limitations of time and place. Thus perceiving the entire order of causal relations  sub specie aeternitatis constitutes the highest form of knowledge.
 
Human individuals feel and know that they are eternal in so far as they conceive things sub specie aeternitatis; this is to know our ideas to be eternal truths, and hence to know that we are in our thought ‘playing the immortal as far as is possible for us’, in Aristotle’s phrase. Through attaining moments of completely disinterested, logical thought, it is possible to glimpse the possibility of living identified or united with God or Nature rather than being finite and perishing modes of Nature. The free person’s intellectual love of God is the enjoyment of this identification or union with God or Nature through reason and the understanding. Human individuals must always pursue this union, even though it can never be completely and permanently achieved. Through this identification, individuals come to know what it would be like to transcend the normal human condition by seeing beyond the limited and partial point of view of understanding ourselves and the Universe.
 
The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it, which is eternal, remains.

E Pt V Prop XXIII

Spinoza explains this in the proposition:

The mind conceives nothing under the form of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis), save so far as it conceives the being of its own body under the form of eternity, that is, save so far as it is eternal

E Pt V Prop XXXI Dem

Spinoza is arguing that human individuals can sometimes have experiences of complete and intuitive understanding, and that it is in these moments that they feel and know themselves in respect of that part of the life of their minds, to be united or identified with the eternal order of Nature. Through adequate ideas, the mind comes to see the world sub specie aeternitatis – without reference to time. With God conceived as a pure rational intelligence, Spinoza is arguing that the life of pure reason is a kind of existence which is quite different from the ordinary life composed of local and temporary attachments, a superior existence beyond decay in which all experience is the enjoyment of eternal truths. For Spinoza, our timebound or localised perceptions of cause and effect belong to mere ‘knowledge of the imagination’ and are therefore not to be confused with the order of self-evident, a priori truth. Thus: ‘In the nature of things no contingent thing is given, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to existing and operating in a certain mode’ (E I, P 29). From which it follows that time has no reality outside the realm of delusory appearances, and therefore that the end of all rational enquiry is to free the mind from its bondage to inadequate (i.e. contingent) ideas. Through the reason vested in the human intellect it is possible for human individuals to transcend the false positivity of sensory impressions, empirical self-evidence, and time and come to contemplate ideas in their eternal (and eternally necessary) order of logical relations.

Spinoza’s view that the mind has access to ‘eternity’ and ‘eternal ideas’ does not imply an afterlife, only that reason, God’s rational intelligence, is ‘time-blind’, with no place for any concept involving tempus, i.e., temporal measure. On this reasoning the mind may be said to possess ‘eternal ideas’ inasmuch as it: ‘transcends time and space in the sense that time and space are for it and it is not in them… The human mind is thus both finite and potentially infinite, both the idea of a finite mode of Extension (and thus itself a finite mode of Thought), and, nevertheless, in being idea, capable of adequate knowledge of the total scheme of things. It is therefore self-transcendent and eternal’ (Norris 41).

Like many metaphysicians and rationalists, like Plato, Leibniz and many others, Spinoza considered time to be, in an ultimate sense, unreal. ‘Duration is only applicable to the existence of modes, eternity is applicable to the existence of substances’ (C XII). Spinoza argues further that ‘measure, time, and number are merely modes of thinking, or rather imagining’ (C, ibib). The world understood through the senses is seen as ordered in time, and diversified in space. This is to apply temporal and arithmetical notions which fail to appreciate the underlying reality.
The universe of reason is timeless, and all that is true of it is true eternally. This implies a world in which there is an eternal immutable calm, wholly free from duration and its constraints, a world in which there is neither motion nor passion nor diversity. Thus: ‘the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit: but, being conscious of himself, of God and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, but possesses eternally true complacency [acquiescentia] of spirit’ (E 5, 47 Scholium).

Spinoza seeks to prove that ‘the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God’ (E2, 47), that by achieving adequate knowledge human individuals come to understand what is divine and eternal. Human individuals, as finite modes, understand their nature and identity sub specie durationis  - under the aspect of time. For it is as finite modes that human beings enjoy the conatus that distinguishes them from the self-sufficient whole of things; to know themselves as separate, individual existences, is to be locked in the time-bound conception that leads to confused and partial knowledge. Thus, the human condition is essentially one of conflict: whereas the concerns of sensuous existence see things temporally and partially, reason aspires towards the eternal totality. The point of Spinoza’s ethics is therefore that human salvation consists in achieving freedom from the bondage of time through coming to see the world sub specie aeternitatis.
 Within the concerns of perishable identity, human individuals imagine themselves to be free. However, ‘men are mistaken in thinking themselves free, and this opinion consists in this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined’ (E 2, 35, Scholium). Spinoza thus reveals that what is commonly regarded as liberty to be an error of imagination, seeing things as contingent, and is incapable of providing happiness. In contrast, reason sees things as necessary (E 2, 44). The more that human individuals understand, therefore, the more the unreality of temporal freedom is revealed; and the more do we appreciate the truth that ‘there is in no mind absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another cause, and this one again by another, and so on ad infinitum’ (E 2, 48). These infinite chains of causal necessity are simply the reflection, sub specie durationis, of that which, seen sub specie aeternitatis, is the eternal and immutable will of God. The illusion that human beings can be free in time is replaced by the certainty that human beings can be free from time. This latter is what Spinoza defines as real and higher freedom.

This section closes with an affirmation of a dual reading of Spinoza’s philosophy as both a genuine philosophical attempt to resolve theological problems of freewill, determinism and divine omnipotence and knowledge of nature and a rational critique of secular institutions and values. Thus the ‘intellectual love of God’ would signify both a knowledge arrived at through the contemplation of adequate ideas conceived sub specie aeternitatis, and also that form of rational investigation that overcomes the ignorance, prejudice or commonsense that limit thought and block knowledge. The secular implications of Spinoza’s philosophy are worth investigating. The fundamental premise of Spinoza’s philosophy is the claim that ‘That thing is called free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone’ (E I, D 6). This means that only God or Nature can be free since God or Nature is a substance that is self-originating (causa sui), depends upon no prior conditions of existence or intelligibility, and hence functions entirely according to its own immanent laws of necessity. The implication is that the greater the understanding of the universal order of causal relations, the less will human beings be subject to illusory ideas, the greater our capacity for effective thought and action. This entails the claim that an increase in knowledge issues in an increase of freedom in the secular and political spheres. This follows from the premise that mind and body are the twofold attributes of a single, indivisible substance; any acquisition of additional powers in the mental realm must necessarily entail a commensurate change in the order of bodily well-being. Thus: ‘he, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal’ (E V, P 39).

7 POLITICS AND RELIGION
Spinoza’s Ethics delineate the emergence of the free person through ascending to the higher levels of cognition, achieving understanding of himself and the world and overcoming the passions. The more man is guided by reason, argues Spinoza, the more he is free. On these premises one can envisage a democracy as a self-governing, self-ordering moral order in which reason rules and coercion has disappeared. The mass of the population constituting the demos, however, do not live as free persons in Spinoza’s sense. They are led by imagination rather than knowledge.


That Spinoza’s philosophy has political implications is clear. Spinoza affirms that the power of each individual is increased through association with other individuals, hence the emergence of society and of politics. With the association of individuals it becomes necessary to establish commonly agreed and accepted rules and principles so that all may live in harmony, for common good of all. This practical problem requires a rational answer: politics therefore becomes a philosophical concern.
 In histories of political philosophy, Spinoza is too easily bracketed with Hobbes, appearing as a minor partner in agreement on all fundamentals with Hobbes. Spinoza read Hobbes carefully and is clearly influenced by him; Spinoza’s own position though, even when in apparently obvious agreement with Hobbes, are derived from very different premises, a difference which makes Spinoza’s argument substantially different and possessing much greater potential. 

Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise was a response to Hobbes rather than a repetition. First and foremost, Spinoza was concerned to defend the principles of tolerance, moderation and self-limiting government. 

Rejecting the view of Spinoza as a pupil of Hobbes, this section affirms Spinoza’s originality as a political philosopher, a counterpart of his metaphysics. Spinoza affirmed the possibility for the scientific and dispassionate study of political and social problems and such political science would exclude moral and religious exhortation. In deriving his political science from a theory of human nature Spinoza is in agreement with Hobbes. Human beings must be understood as natural organisms if the conditions of a stable society are to be discerned. Such an approach refuses to project an ideal conception of human nature, and rules out moral preferences as expressing subjective tastes and passive emotions. A clear and distinct idea of the necessary principles of government requires a clear and distinct idea of ‘man and his place in Nature’. From this agreement in grounding politics in human nature, Spinoza parts company with Hobbes. Corresponding to the division between imagination and intellect, Spinoza offers a dual justification – religious and philosophical – for a single conception of the state. Since individuals are led by both imagination and intellect, it is necessary to present arguments which appeal to both so that all citizens will understand why they should accept the laws to which they are subject.
Everything that happens in human societies happens in accordance with necessary laws, and the only possibility for freedom lies in understanding these laws are and consciously adapting to them. Spinoza thus argues for a purely logical and scientific study of society and religion. Affirming the unity of theory and practice, Spinoza argues for the use of pure reason, the method of clear and distinct ideas, in politics and other departments of the secular world as in philosophy. This has radical implications. Whereas true philosophy consists in the intellectual love of God, religion is based on a more passionate and temporal love in seeing God sub specie durationis, presented through the medium of inadequate and imaginative ideas. Spinoza’s metaphysics have practical relevance to the world as the introduction of reason in ethics and politics; the life of the free and intelligent person delineated by Spinoza’s philosophy, upon which true freedom and happiness is predicated, is blocked by religious persecution, ideological wars and intolerance.

Natural Law and natural right.
Though Spinoza would seem, at first glance, to share certain conclusions in his political philosophy with Hobbes, Spinoza’s conclusions are deduced from very different premises. In outline, Spinoza and Hobbes are largely in agreement on certain key tenets. Both proceeded from a conception of human nature to argue that political philosophy must start from the proposition that all individuals necessarily seek power and liberty; they both agreed that the end which all men pursue in political associations is to overcome a war of all against all to achieve peace and security; and they both agreed that this end can be achieved only by vesting of superior power and superior means of coercion in some particular person or group of persons. Spinoza and Hobbes shared an amoral or naturalistic approach to all political problems, rejecting appeals to moral notions and supernatural sanctions associated with organised religion. To both Spinoza and Hobbes, power rather than some moral ideal or projection abstracted from human nature and power is the fundamental concept in the study of political order and society. Every polity is to be analysed according to its effect upon the distribution of power; both were concerned to achieve that particular distribution of power to avoid anarchy, identified as the greatest of evils.

If human beings are conceived as natural objects, it makes little sense to suppose that they have moral rights or duties; as natural objects, each necessarily pursuing power, liberty, their extension and preservation, all that can be claimed is that human beings have the right to do whatever they have the power to do. In conceiving ‘right’ as ‘power’, Spinoza uses a common moral term in  quite uncommon way. His argument can be more readily understood by replacing the word ‘right’, which has moral connotations in ordinary usage which are contrary to Spinoza’s meaning, with the word ‘power’.
Spinoza’s view here needs to be related to the natural law tradition. Here, the influence of Grotius is important. Grotius affirmed natural law to be the foundation of sovereignty, and the final arbiter of human conflict. The natural law is implanted in human beings by virtue of their reason. The existence of law and a system of jurisprudence is to be explained by the fact that the behaviour of  human beings is not – as yet – entirely governed by reason. The implication is that should human beings come to obey the natural law so that the reason within each and all comes to govern human affairs, the system of law would not be required. The legal system exists as an effective substitute for reason in the motives of unreasonable individuals. To this defence of natural law Hobbes added that rights are nothing without the power which would enforce them; the conclusion followed that power rather than right is the basic fact of politics.
 Spinoza’s originality lay in the way that he could, on his own premises, agree in part with both philosophers. Spinoza agreed that there was no distinction between rights and powers, and no ‘natural law’ other than the one that the universe already obeys:





Spinoza concludes that the person or persons who possess supreme power within a state also possess the right to exercise that power. Spinoza agreed with Grotius and Hobbes in arguing that this power is conferred upon the sovereign by a ‘social contract’, through which individuals pass from the contending disorder of the ‘state of nature’ to the peace and cooperation of a civil society [civitas] (T xvi). This social contract effectively transfers the rights of the subject to the sovereign. The only rights (or powers) which the subject retains are those which cannot be relinquished since they belong to the essence of whatever possesses them: ‘no one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights, as to cease to be a man’ (T xvii). Human beings thus retain a ‘natural right’ to those things which constitute their inalienable power: life, reason, and the self-affirmation which is integral to the conatus which defines each and all. Hence ‘the natural right of universal nature, and consequently of every individual thing, extends so far as its power’ (P ii, 4).

At this point, Spinoza took his independent leave of Hobbes. Spinoza was proceeding from very different premises. One appreciates here that it is not so much the conclusion as the process of reaching that conclusion which is important – the pursuit of power and liberty, the identification of power and right, the end of peace and security. Reflecting substantial differences in their logical and general philosophy, Spinoza and Hobbes define freedom very differently and place different emphases upon it. 

In his metaphysics and political philosophy, Hobbes holds a pessimist view of human nature and possibilities for human society; there is no possibility of projecting the good life for human beings on Hobbes’ premises. In Hobbes’ philosophy, the extent of human freedom is the satisfaction of desires, whatever these desires may be. There is no distinctions between levels of cognition in Hobbes; Hobbes leaves human beings enslaved to impulse. To be free, according to Hobbes’ philosophy, is to do what one wants; desires and impulses are mechanically or physiologically determined. There is no role here for a positive conception of freedom or for politics as the creative realisation of the rational human essence; the best that can be hoped for on Hobbesian premises is peace and security as no more than the negative – and temporary - condition of not being persecuted or destroyed. The Hobbesian state achieves not the good life but a temporary shelter from pain and fear.

It becomes apparent that, far from being allies, Spinoza and Hobbes belong to diametrically opposed camps. Spinoza’s naturalistic approach to politics is markedly different to Hobbes’, placing Spinoza firmly in the rationalist camp as against Anglo-American individualism. Spinoza reveals Hobbes’ conception of reason to be narrow and limited. Whereas for Hobbes the exercise of reason is merely the means to self-preservation and the satisfaction of desire, for Spinoza it constitutes the supreme end subordinating all else as a means; and whereas Hobbes makes reason the empirical calculation of probabilities, to Spinoza it is the reconstruction by logical reasoning of the necessary order of the universe. To Spinoza, the political order is to be evaluated according to whether it obstructs or facilitates the free person’s intellectual love of God and understanding of Nature. Spinoza’s understanding of reason gives his philosophy a much more expansive and positive character in terms of human freedom, peace and security and possibilities for cooperation than that of Hobbes. Politically and historically, Spinoza has been identified with the enemies of authoritarianism in a way that Hobbes never was. Spinoza’s advocacy of the liberal values of toleration and freedom of thought flow naturally from his general philosophy, showing how his scientific and amoral naturalism contain an idealistic vision of a free society.

Justice
In a state of nature, individuals have little natural right. Only by associating with other individuals in society does the individual come to appreciate the true community of interests which unites each and all, enabling each individual to increase his or her power by joining it to the power of other individuals. In a state of nature, led by imagination, appetite and desire, each individual perceives other individuals to be inherently inimical, and strives against them. Further, in lacking the power to impose justice upon others, the individual lacks the right to it; there is therefore no wrongdoing [peccatum] in a state of nature. Since justice and wrongdoing are products of political organisation, they can exist only where there is sovereignty [imperium].





Since the subject obtains enhanced power through the formation of a civil society protected by a sovereign, disobedience to the sovereign can never be justified on grounds of justice. The sovereign confronts the subject at every point with the obligation to be ruled and the sovereign’s right to dominion is, ultimately, self-legitimating. Nevertheless, the fact that every sovereign exercises a right to rule, does not mean that every political order is equally conducive to human happiness and freedom. Freedom therefore constitutes a criterion of perfection. Different political orders are to be evaluated according to the extent to which they meet or depart from freedom. Since freedom is inextricably connected with the political order, government is not conceived to be a mere means to freedom. Freedom is the very conatus of the political order conceived as an organism, cannot be separated from the political order, and which can only be realised through the institutions of government.

Although all individuals strive to increase their own pleasure and power, they must recognize that their survival depends upon practising mutual aid between them; in strictly utilitarian terms, nothing is so useful to an individual as other individuals. Individuals thus enter into written and unwritten compacts as the condition of society. Spinoza considers that the laws and conventions of a political society or state derive their claim to obedience solely from their use in serving the essential interests of the individual subject to them; once a particular law or convention no longer protects, or even threatens, the security or happiness of a particular individual, that individual is no longer obliged to obey it. A law or social convention is obeyed only for so long as it is expedient to the people subject to it are concerned to obey it; once it ceases to contribute to the security and happiness of the people, its claim upon their allegiance disappears. The decision to undertake to conform to and obey a law or convention does not constitute a binding and irrevocable obligation. The needs and interests of the individuals can be overridden by nothing, either in principle or in practice. The maintenance of a political society depends upon the persons supporting its laws or conventions having, or seeming to have, greater power than those opposing its laws or conventions.

Contracts, treaties, and oaths are in themselves just words; what counts is their effectiveness in action. Without the means of coercion and enforcement, such contracts, treaties, oaths etc remain just words and no stable society is possible; a state of anarchy issues. It follows that the legitimacy of an authority is inextricably connected with its effectiveness in action.

Within an organised political order the individual is protected against violence and the encroachment of others and, by mutual aid, cooperation and the proper division of labour, the natural needs and wants of individuals are supplied. Rebellion against the civil authority is justifiable only in extremity, in defence of personal interests or loyalties. Spinoza’s point here is that, however great any particular injustice suffered in any existing civil society, the loss of the peace and security that that civil order provides is nearly always a greater injury to personal power and freedom.

The sovereign ceases to be a sovereign in becoming so oppressive or threatening to freedom and happiness as to create sufficiently numerous and powerful enemies; as the members of the society observe that effective power is beginning to change hands a tide of disobedience follows.

The rational individual will recognise that government will seek to extend their own power and dominion without end. Accepting government for what it is, the rational individual will seek the stable adjustment of conflicting interests. If the ruling authority would be foolish to make enemies by the oppression of the citizens, so citizens would be foolish to risk anarchy by overturning government in defence of minor liberties. 

Whilst Spinoza has something in common with the way that Machiavelli wrote in a secular and scientific spirit of politics as a technique of government, he did not, like Machiavelli, identify politics as such with the practical art of obtaining and preserving state-power as an end in itself. On the contrary, Spinoza is concerned with the freedom and power of the individual as the end; government and an ordered political society are an indispensable means to that end, or, in the least, a safeguard against anarchy and oppression. Machiavelli is concerned most of all with government and its success or failure. 

Since most individuals are necessarily governed by passive emotions they lack a clear and objective understanding of the laws which govern their behaviour. It is these passive emotions which lead individuals into conflict with each other. The implication is that if human beings came to have a clear and objective understanding of the laws governing their behaviour, positive coercion and the concentration of power in the hands of the government (imperium) would no longer be needed.

The nature of the state
Spinoza’s argument is firmly rational rather than individualist or atomistic. To Spinoza, a civil society is a form of corporate agency. Although civil society is composed of individual human beings as its constituent parts, it also has its own conatus, a life and individuality of its own which confers on it the absolute right to preserve its own being. A civil society therefore ‘does wrong when it does, or suffers to be done, things which may be the cause of its own ruin’ (P iv, 4). No less than the human body, the body politic may possess more or less power, virtue, or freedom. Since virtue, power and freedom are one and the same, and identical with reason, Spinoza defines the task of politics to be the creation of a constitution that is obedient to reason, just as the task of the individual person is to understand and submit to the laws of reason. Here Spinoza affirms the central thesis of the tradition of rational freedom: the replacement of external institutional-systemic coercion by internal moral coordination. For the submission of the state to reason is achieved not by the virtue of the ruler as distinct from the ruled but by the adoption of a constitution that renders the possession of virtue by the ruler redundant: 





The virtue of the state is achievable only by the creation and adoption of a constitution that limits the power of individuals, and ensures the independent reasonableness of the political process. Spinoza’s thought leads in the direction of a democracy which limits power in accordance with reason. More than the procedure for acquiring and transferring power, Spinoza is concerned with the internal division of power itself. Spinoza argues against vesting the powers of state in a single person or council since this reduces the independence of both the sovereign and the subject. The sovereign, as the sole interpreter of the laws, lacks the motive to change them; the subject is reduced to a blind obedience. Hence ‘contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to a single council or man, should without doubt be broken, when it is expedient for the general welfare to do so’ (P iv, 6).

Spinoza advocates an active citizen democracy, arguing in favour of a privy council, proceeding according to a rule of rotation, with offices successively filled by individuals who have demonstrated their fitness to hold them as citizens. To ensure that this active citizenship is real rather than fictitious, Spinoza emphasises the need to remove the sole right to interpret the law which sanctions their conduct from those who exercise the sovereign power. For ‘those who administer or possess sovereignty always try to surround their high-handed actions with an aspect of legality, and to persuade the people that they act from good motives, this they are easily able to effect when they are the sole interpreters of the law’ (T xvii).

Power is to be vested not in individuals but in the offices that they occupy so that an office is both a power conferred and a power limited by its conferment. Spinoza therefore demands a rule of offices as against a rule of persons. Whereas a rule of persons is subject to the passions of those who exercise it, the rule of offices is inherently responsive to the demands of reason.

Spinoza understood that the heart and soul of any polity or any city was the citizen body. The history of the Netherlands demonstrated to him that the long term health and vitality of the towns could be ensured only if individuals were citizens, prepared to lay down their lives for their common salvation. He therefore advocated the formation of a citizen army as the most effective and rational device. In both public and private life, therefore, honour may be required by reason, and is a part of power (E 4, 58). The free and intelligent person will recognise the intrinsic virtue of offices and reject the rule of prophets and figureheads, who claim a purely personal loyalty.

Spinoza affirms truth to be our only standard in overcoming enslavement to circumsances. The possibility of freedom lies in the fact that each and every human being possesses a rational capacity which makes it possible to distinguish truth from falsehood, and face the world without illusions. Human dignity consists in the exercise of this rational capacity. In embracing truth and transcending immediate concerns, human individuals come to see the world under the aspect of permanence. Such truth in all likelihood will contradict the way the world seems to those guided by illusion and immediacy. Existing authorities and all those comfortable with existing – illusory – belief may well repudiate truth and silence those seeking to publicise it; it is most common for human beings to seek refuge in a ‘prophetic order’ which promises a world according to our illusions, leading individuals down a road to nowhere, ensuring that all remain victims of circumstances they neither understand nor control. The political order, in which individuals are open to the truth, is a rare achievement. But it is upon the achievement of such an order upon which human power and freedom rest.
Truth means much more than science. In the twentieth century, science has been in the service of the prophetic order much more than has worked for the achievement of the secular or political order. As superstition triumphed in politics on a scale that has become increasingly irrational, violent and murderous, science has been pervasive; superstition has come to wear the cloak of science. Science has, apparently, triumphed over religion only to create superstition in new, inhuman, form in which means replace ends, technique replaces ontology. Overcome by nihilism that issues from a disenchanted world, human beings succumb to illusions – superstitions born of meaninglessness.
 The solution is not to reject the scientific for the religious or prophetic worldview, but to go further along the path of disenchantment, recovering truth within the scientific paradigm so that old superstitions are not replaced by new. The end of truth is re-enchantment, understanding the union of God and Nature.
For Spinoza the supreme ends of government are security and intellectual freedom; so important are these ends that the individual can reasonably sacrifice lesser liberties and interests so long as government ensures these two ends. Spinoza thus identifies a principle of legitimate authority as distinct from the blind obedience associated with authoritarianism. Only a slave obeys authority when it is not acting in his or her interest. A government that ensures the physical safety and the intellectual freedom of its subjects constitutes a legitimate authority; this authority can be reasonably obeyed since it satisfies the necessary conditions of human freedom and happiness. Spinoza, as distinct from Hobbes, can separate authority from authoritarianism, showing how authoritarianism actually issues in the anarchy it claims to be preventing by suppressing individual liberty and freedom of thought and religious toleration; these supreme ends are more important to the individual than mere physical safety. Spinoza argues that if these supreme ends are sacrificed to state power, the most essential interests of the individual have been lost, a condition which subverts perpetual peace. 

Though all politics to Spinoza is necessarily power politics, this power pertains to reason rather than coercion. The free and intelligent person’s first aim must be to persuade others to achieve freedom by becoming equally intelligent in the pursuit of security; the free and intelligent person has a direct interest in freeing others from the passive emotions which entail the superstitions which generate conflict and are inimical to the freedom of thought. 

Prophecy and politics
Spinoza thus organises the state as a system of laws and institutions which facilitates the influence of reason. Spinoza’s argument is based upon a contrast between philosophy, which is guided by reason, and faith, which is guided by prophecy. This is to recognise a split between a secular order of freedom and a prophetic order of unfreedom.

The ruling principle of the state is secular and not religious. The state is in complete control of the formation and dignity of office and has the final power to determine the rites of religion. Since religion is an inner rather than an outer condition, it truly flourishes only in that state ‘where everyone’s judgement is free and untrammelled, where each man may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things clear and precious’ (T, Preface). The prophetic order, in which the guiding principle of rule is religious, serves to destroy the conditions of our salvation, by sacrificing religion as an inner condition to its outward form, thus destroying the principle upon which peace and happiness depend: the respect for truth. Spinoza’s argument proceeds inexorably to the advocacy of freedom of thought. Since ‘the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man’, ‘the rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is common to all – not any supernatural light nor any external authority’ (TPT p119).
 
‘In despotic statecraft’, Spinoza writes, ‘the supreme and essential mystery [is] to hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them down, with the specious garb of religion’ (TPT p5).





Spinoza was highly sceptical of all religious truth-claims, particularly those which appealed to scriptural authority backed up with the threat of sanctions (real or supernatural) for anyone who challenged their presumptive self-evidence.

As distinct from the prophetic order, human affairs in the political order are organised in accordance with reason; freedom of thought is valued as the indispensable condition of government. The political order seeks to unite individuals so as to permit the development of their multifarious purposes whilst resolving any conflicts that arise in the process. The political order is therefore a secular order founded upon law, embodied in institutions as obedience to reason, ensuring compromise, tolerance and justice. Spinoza advocates limited government and defends civil and religious liberty. Ultimately, Spinoza’s thought leads to the end of  democracy as a self-governing society and self-regulating politics which replaces external coercive rule by a moral coordination which is intrinsic to the body politic.

Spinoza affirms freedom and truth as emancipatory notions; whereas contemporary postmodern thinkers are concerned to expose the way that truth is a delusive notion which serves to legitimise increasingly powerful and sophisticated apparatuses of social surveillance and control, Spinoza offers a way of defining truth in such a way as to subvert such totalitarian intent.

Spinoza repudiates the Hobbesian thesis that equates power and coercion so that naked self-interest becomes the sole motivating force in human affairs. In the Hobbesian thesis, the state is no more than the product of a contract concluded in order to protect each from the destructive effects of self-interest. Spinoza does conceive social structures to be power infused, shot through by relations of force; he agrees that individuals are subject to an omnipresent will-to-power. Spinoza distinguishes himself from Hobbes very clearly here by distinguishing between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ modes of being which issue in differing capacities for effective, self-promoting agency. By transforming ‘passive’ into ‘active’ ideas through the exercise of reason, achieving more adequate self-knowledge through the ‘lively intellect’, individuals and collectivities achieve a more adequate grasp of the forces that have hitherto enslaved them within an alien and oppressive social order. Reason thus comes to confront and overcome the ‘sad passions’ which necessarily issue from the mind’s subjection to an alien causality.

 On these premises, democracy is the highest, most enlightened form of social order, giving the greatest scope for the exercise of the rational capacity possessed by each and all. Democracy is thus conceived as a condition of rational self-determination. In contrast with other forms of government, democracy presumes the freely-willed assent on the part of individuals considered as rational, thinking beings, as citizens who consciously agree to exchange some partial and limited personal freedoms for the greater freedom that results from the achievement of civil peace and a communal modus vivendi. Ideally, ‘if human nature were such that men desired nothing but what true reason prescribes, a society would need no laws whatsoever; for men to do of their own free will what is really for their benefit it would be enough to teach them true moral precepts’ (TPT p73). This points to the rational end of internal moral coordination replacing external institutional-systemic control. Should human beings obey the reason implanted with them, ethics would be directly translated into politics, making it possible to dispense with laws, institutions and governments. Spinoza doubts that reason can be developed this far: ‘no society can exist without government and force, and hence without laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites of men’ (ibid). Falling short of the rational ideal of ethico-social self-regulation, there seems no option but to accept the Hobbesian restriction of the state to the coercive regulation of anarchic individualism. What keeps Spinoza on the side of the optimists as against the pessimists is his view that the state abuses its authority in interfering in matters of judgement, opinion or conscience; in respecting these freedoms, democracy is the form of government best suited to the interests of reason and justice. 
Thus according to Spinoza:





The difference between Spinoza and Hobbes becomes clear with respect to the contrasting ways in which Spinoza and Hobbes define the term ‘natural condition’. To Hobbes, the state of nature is an anarchical chaos of conflicting wills, interests and desires, a ceaseless war of all against all which is controlled only by the imposition of the coercive power of the state. As against this, Spinoza conceives the ‘natural condition’ to be a life conducted in accordance with the dictates of reason, or in pursuit of those common goods like justice, freedom and truth which reason identifies as the highest objects of civilised social existence.

Spinoza’s philosophy affirms the unity of theory and practice, working within the realities of socio-political life in pursuit of the highest ideals of reason and truth. Spinoza’s reason serves as both a source of affirmative ideals and as an emancipatory critique of existing unreason in the form of prejudice, religious dogma, erroneous belief which obstruct the emergence of a free and rational polity. Spinoza therefore demonstrates the compatibility of realism and idealism in political affairs so that political action can be subject to the powers and prerogatives of reason.

This argument emphasises the extent to which epistemological values such as truth, falsehood, error and arguments concerning the goodness of political orders in terms of the degree of rational accountability are connected in Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza argues that democracy is the best order in being able to combine the virtues of preserving the peace through a common assent to laws established for the general good, whilst simultaneously ensuring freedom of thought and conscience for those who give assent only on condition that these freedoms be respected.






Such a state of civil society has yet to be achieved; the mass of humanity throughout history have been characterised by a passive acquiescence in laws, customs or decrees whose force is established by absolute sovereign will rather than reason. Human beings pass beyond this passive stage once they begin to exercise the rational capacity to force the state to legitimise its authority and power by achieving the best working balance between the need to ensure security and peace and the need to facilitate rational self-determination on the part of enlightened citizens. Thus: ‘it is impossible for thought to be completely subject to another’s control, because no-one can give up to another his natural right to reason freely and form his own judgement about everything, nor can he be compelled to do so’ (TPT 262). In this aspect Spinoza anticipates the way that Kant made the free exercise of religious, moral and political conscience the absolute prerequisite of an enlightened social order.

For individuals who live by imagination, this habit of passive obedience is the surest way to peace and contentment. Since this is so, religion is necessary to the life of the state, and needs to be protected by the civil authorities.
The sovereign state determines the form of religion that should prevail upon political grounds: ‘Religion acquires its force as law solely from the decrees of the sovereign. God has no special kingdom among men except in so far as He reigns through temporal rulers. Moreover, the rites of religion and the outward observances of piety should be in accordance with the public peace and well-being, and should therefore be determined by the sovereign power’ (T xix). Spinoza makes it clear that this subordination of religion to the secular political power applies only to the external observances. The inner religion of the free person is not the subject of legislation: ‘Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state..’ (T vii).

Since a rational political order is concerned to secure the obedience of its subjects, it will permit freedom of thought and conscience as compatible with good order. A rationally governed state is a free in that ‘every may think what he likes, and say what he thinks’:

The real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgement which they are unable to tyrannize over.

Theological-Political Treatise Ch XX

Spinoza therefore reconciles the search for ‘adequate’ or ‘eternal’ ideas with the view of philosophy as a rational discipline that has practical relevance within the socio-political domain. Philosophy achieves the freedom to search for adequate ideas only with the achievement of a just political system. Since this ideal was so far from any past or present society, Spinoza acknowledged that the philosopher needed to engage those manifold errors of prejudice, delusional thinking, narrow self-interest etc which served to block the emergence of a just and rational polity.
 
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise sought to prove the proposition that just as a rational government requires enlightened and tolerant citizens, so free persons require an enlightened and tolerant government. Spinoza proves this proposition as the direct consequence of his metaphysical conception of a person as a finite mode of Nature, necessarily seeking his own preservation, and achieving freedom and happiness through the rational understanding of Nature and of himself. Following Plato, Spinoza argues that virtue is its own reward in underlining the fact that freedom and happiness are within; Spinoza is therefore concerned with the conditions in which true freedom can develop, insisting that organised religion and conventional morality must be confined to the externals of human behaviour, for their own good as much as for freedom of mind. Spinoza was concerned above all that the exercise of free intelligence was untrammelled by religious and political restriction and properly rewarded. With education free from state-control, public business publicly transacted, and the churches disestablished and maintained at the expense of true believers, each individual would be free to live his own life and exercise his rational capacity to understand the world, attaining freedom and happiness within a neutral framework of mutual convenience. For Spinoza, this rational and non-interfering government would most likely be a ‘democracy’ in which participation was subject to a property qualification. No doubt, Spinoza was thinking of the mercantile community of Amsterdam, which gave asylum to people of many creeds and denominations, on condition that they were willing to keep the peace. 

Spinoza states that the ideal political order is a ‘constitution of liberty’, and defines a constitution [iura] to be ‘the soul of the sovereign body [anima imperii]’ (P x, 9). Human beings require political freedom in order to realise that other freedom, reason,  which constitutes happiness: ‘a man is so far free, as he is led by reason, because so far is he determined to action by such cases as can be adequately understood by his unassisted nature’ (P ii, 2). The rule of this ‘causality of freedom’ is possible only with freedom of thought and conscience. There is a need to establish a communication community in which the pursuit of truth proceeds without check. Since human beings are naturally prey to fear, with thoughts dominated by the imagination, there is always a tendency for them to believe the promises of salvation made by the prophetic order. Human beings thus come to enslave themselves to circumstances in order to overcome fear and conflict; the tendency to succumb to such illusory promises of security fail to understand that ‘peace is more than the mere absence of war, but rather a virtue which springs from the fortitude of the soul’ (P v, 4). Spinoza is contemptuous of the peace and security promised and accepted on the terms offered by the prophetic order: ‘if slavery, barbarism and desolation are to be called peace, peace is the greatest misfortune that men can suffer’ (P vi, 4).
Genuine peace and security can be achieved only in a political order; the obedience to and assent to the laws of this political order are not a form of coercion or slavery within an authoritarian order, but, on the contrary, recognise a principle of legitimate authority which is a form of freedom. To be forced by reason – to activate the rational power that is within each and all - is to be free. Obedience to the laws of a constitution is therefore in accordance with the demands of reason, and, since this reason  is a quality possessed by all, is democratic in its end. From this perspective, civil disobedience is not an assertion of freedom but of inner bondage, threatening the conditions of freedom.

Spinoza’s point is that since thought is governed by its own laws, with each individual compelled to conclusions by the necessity of reason, the curtailment of thought is both absurd and counter-productive. Since the expression of reason in public life permits the rational discussion and resolution of conflict as well as the common pursuit of truth it is the greatest source of peace and harmony. Those who destroy peace and harmony are those who suppress this freedom of thought and conscience (T xx). Freedom of thought and conscience are therefore required if a state is to rule in accordance with reason:





Freedom of speech must be ensured by government as the necessary consequence of free thought, and should be restricted only in so far as it entails action which contradicts the legitimate demands of law and government.
Spinoza’s philosophy and his political theory centre upon the bifurcation between law as a matter of revealed truth, divine injunction or sovereign command on the one hand and law as an order of rational necessity, corresponding to the human ontology, understood from the standpoint of an adequate knowledge, on the other.
The grand claims that Spinoza makes for the potential emancipatory powers of reason are accompanied by an awareness of the limited perspectives, confused states of knowledge, and ignorance of causal relations generating delusional beliefs that obstruct the power of reason. Thus Spinoza argues that,

the mind has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused knowledge, as often as it perceives things in the common order of nature, that is to say, as often as it is determined to the contemplation of this or that externally – namely, by a chance coincidence, and not as often as it is determined internally – for the reason that it contemplates several things at once, and is determined to understand in what they differ, agree, or oppose one another; for whenever it is internally disposed in this or in any other way, it then contemplates things clearly and distinctly.

E II, P 29 schol

Spinoza is not seeking to separate reason from the contingencies of everyday life, ‘the common order of nature’. But Spinoza realises that knowledge is achieved as a result of a difficult process of theorising and fact-crunching – or truths of experience and truths of reason – which necessarily is affected by the limits imposed by the existing conditions of history, circumstance or received opinion. For Spinoza, the ideas of reason, truth, political justice, enlightenment, progress etc are not denied by the fact that they have yet to find a permanent embodiment in the record of human social institutions. Indeed, they retain life and vitality through the perceived inconsistency between the way things are and the way things would be should reason achieve a more adequate knowledge of its own best interests and those of humanity at large.
The rational component of power gives Spinoza’s philosophy its emancipatory character; reason as a radical ‘ought to be’ may propose an alternative to the ‘is’ which cannot be validated by any appeal to empirical existence, but which expresses an enlightened self-interest on the part of good-willed subjects whose judgement has transcended prevailing forms of prejudice. Reason upholds the possibility of conceiving a social order that would represent a definite stage of advance beyond historically specific modes of social existence.
This rationalism is implicit in Spinoza’s argument concerning the various modalities of knowledge, the prevalence of ‘confused ideas’, and the occurrence of error as a determinate effect of material causes whose nature is accessible to reasoned analysis. This emancipatory thrust of Spinoza’s philosophy contains the potential to analyse the dialectic of enlightenment, showing why progress has so often turned into social regress. The discrepancy between the historical record and reason as a mode of enlightened speculative thought gives grounds for optimism. Spinoza shows how it is possible to maintain a philosophical commitment to values of freedom, democracy, and progress, whilst at the same time exposing the historical experience which contradicts those values. There is a need to distinguish between judgements that issue in cognitive truth-claims (involving an appeal to intuition or phenomenal self-evidence), and judgements that derive from the sensus communis of a shared commitment to as-yet unrealised values and ideals.
For Spinoza, evidence of past and present failure may issue in rational reflection on the delusional thinking to which subjects are prone when falling short of reason. The fact that the historical record contradicts these values and ideals does not entail their repudiation; it is to identify and challenge the obstacles that have stood in their way and which have ultimately brought about their abandonment. There is implicit in Spinoza’s philosophy an ideal community or ‘commonwealth’ of free and equal discourse in which subjects engage in the full exercise of those rational powers that belong to them properly as social beings. Spinoza’s use of the term ‘commonwealth’ entails a commitment to principles of freedom and justice which cannot be contradicted by the inauspicious record so far. As ideas of reason, justice, freedom, progress and ‘perpetual peace’ cannot be disproved by reference to the historical record.
Thus:





Spinoza differentiates himself from Hobbes here. The way that Hobbes makes the pursuit of power the sole determinant of social or cultural values removes the differences between various political orders. For Spinoza, however, the term ‘commonwealth’ contains strong evaluative connotations which allow him to differentiate between orders and the way that power is expressed or articulated. Certainly, Spinoza’s ‘commonwealth’ affirms the idea that any social order worthy of the name will exhibit a principled commitment to the values of peace, freedom and democracy.
The ‘commonwealth’ ideal operates in Spinoza’s philosophy as a regulative idea. The term involves an implicit appeal to values and principles attained through the exercise of reason, its meaning is not to be understood by reference to a past or present society. This savours a great deal of Habermas’s theory of communicative action predicated upon an ‘ideal speech situation’. Spinoza and Habermas identify the highest good of the commonwealth with its capacity for promoting the free and equal discourse of its various members - interest-groups, political parties, or specialised communities of knowledge. To achieve such a community, government must acknowledge the limits of executive power, and desist from legislative interference in matters of ethical, religious or political conscience. This would issue in an autonomous ‘public sphere’ of enlightened debate in which issues are discussed with the end of attaining a rational consensus uncoerced by any form of orthodox opinion or power-seeking interest.
Whilst this ideal of uncoerced rational agreement can, at best, claim only partial realisation in the history of social institutions, it is implicit every act of communicative exchange, articulating a reciprocal need to understand and to be understood. The knowledge that the workings of prejudice, self-interest, or erroneous belief have served to block understanding reveals the extent to which the ideal has yet to be attained.

These points have a bearing upon the critique of Enlightenment discourse as a project of containment and mastery, one whose totalitarian implications can be read in the history of ‘enlightened’ reason as applied to various ‘other’ cultures (Connolly). In Madness and Civilisation Foucault reveals the extent to which power/knowledge discourses come to impose their own normative categories and, in the process, exclude, marginalize and suppress other, more subversive forms of discourse. The problem is that Foucault, in repudiating the possibility of providing criteria for rational critique, cannot avoid perpetual power/knowledge struggle between disparate interests. Once enlightened rationality is repudiated as a species of oppressive, totalitarian discourse it is no longer possible to conceive rational argument and critique as constructive interventions in dialogue. Since the question of what authorizes reason to pronounce in matters of truth and falsehood or right and wrong itself requires reasoned argument, Habermas is correct to affirm the existence of normative constraints upon the engagement in dialogue, making arguments, giving reasons, which are not coercive or issue from a will to exclude or marginalize ‘other’ forms of discourse. These normative constraints are not complicit with the ‘Enlightenment’ drive for mastery and control which Adorno and Horkheimer identify as the dialectic of modernity and its crises. Rather, these constraints operate as a regulative ideal that projects and promises the possibility of achieving uncoerced rational agreement against all the various contending forces of prejudice, self-interest, and unargued doctrinal orthodoxy.
It is precisely in these terms that Spinoza advocates democracy as the form of government best suited to attaining and maintaining the interests of justice, security and peace. A ‘commonwealth’ is worthy of the name according to the extent to which it provides platforms for the free expression of dissenting views, religious and political, and the scope it offers for these views to be assessed according to their merits. This implies the existence of a ‘public sphere’ characterised by free and open rational debate. Spinoza’s thinking here anticipates Habermas’s ‘transcendental pragmatics’, in which social well-being is identified with the achievement of broad-based consensus values achieved through a critical reflection on the arguments advanced rather than acquiescence in arguments emerging in accordance with the dominant (‘commonsense’) view. 

It is here that Spinoza’s position is distinguished most from contract theorists like Hobbes, for whom the legitimacy of the state is solely attributable to the fact that it is necessary to overcome the ‘natural’ condition of anarchic appetitive desire – the bellum omnium contra omnes. Without the state as the ultimate law giving source of authority, society would be rent asunder the contending forces of sectarian dispute or the naked expression of a will-to-power on the part of various interests. The contract view considers power interests to be the sole reality of social life. There is no scope in such a view for any appeal to enlightened values. 
Against this view Spinoza affirms the possibility of normative constraints – forms of a priori collective enlightened self-interest – which serve to transcend these disintegrating forces to achieve a greater harmony. Spinoza’s ‘commonwealth’ savours a great deal of the Habermasian communication community predicated upon the ideal ‘speech situation’ containing the promise of a genuine rational consensus, a forum established to realise the civil peace through uncoerced rational discussion and agreement. 

Spinoza is in agreement with Hobbes that political science must proceed from the facts of ‘human nature’ as manifest in the history of social institutions. Though Spinoza argues that reason alone gives access to ultimate truths, i.e. the knowledge that enables individuals to pursue their best interests as citizen members of a democratic political order, he affirms in the Political Treatise that the various material causes and factors that often obstruct the realisation of happiness are neither unreal or delusory. Spinoza condemns political theories which project an as yet unattained – and most likely unattainable – condition of social life for their irrelevance. Spinoza’s thought is anti-utopian in checking the speculative impulse through the recognition of the limits of accountable knowledge. Thus:





Criticising thinkers who ‘conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be’, Spinoza argues that those who approach real-life from the lofty ideals of theoretical abstraction will come to see society as no more than a woeful chaos of conflicting interests and desires: ‘instead of ethics, they have generally written satire, and they have never conceived a theory of politics which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in utopia, or in that golden age of the poets when, to be sure, there was least need of it’ (PT p287).
Spinoza’s political philosophy offers a regulative ideal which promises an end to civil discord, replacing mutual misunderstanding with uncoerced rational consensus. 

Spinoza’s philosophical project rests emancipation upon the attainment of self-knowledge through the conscious, disciplined reflection on hitherto repressed or recalcitrant desires. Feuer thus locates Spinoza within the mainstream of liberal-Enlightenment thought. Thus, ‘when we know the causes of our irrational behaviour, the irrational motives themselves lose their force, and we can then act rationally in accordance with our desires as we now clearly apprehend them’ (Feuer p221).
Spinoza conceives mind and body to be two distinct ‘attributes’ of a unitary phenomenon whose capacity for ‘active’ or ‘passive’ existence varies according to its possession of more or less ‘adequate’ ideas. It follows that Spinoza cannot privilege – in Cartesian or epistemological terms - consciousness as a source of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ that could somehow transcend the evidence of bodily experience. Feuer draws the analogy between Spinoza and Freud as thinkers concerned with ‘reclaiming’ instinctual energies and drives and elevating them to the level of ‘adequate ideas’ in the service of a better, more enlightened social order.
Spinoza distinguishes between consciousness and knowledge so as to argue – as against Descartes – that the only measure of ‘adequate’ ideas is their capacity to transform passive into active knowledge, enabling individuals to grasp the determinate conditions of their existence, and thus diminishing the degree of their enslavement to causes beyond their powers of active comprehension. Spinoza thus belongs squarely to the tradition of rational freedom – from Plato and Aristotle to Habermas - which defines emancipation, freedom and happiness with the overcoming of error through the attainment of self-knowledge. Spinoza insists that such knowledge is the ultimate good in that its benefits extend beyond the individual to the government of the well-ordered commonwealth. Further, the exercise of the rational capacity induces the ‘active’ use of those faculties that have hitherto been subordinated to the forces of natural causality. Spinoza therefore writes:





The influence of Spinoza’s philosophy can be seen in Hegel’s system. Hegel critically appropriated and transformed the key principles of the Ethics. Spinoza’s God or Nature as the single unique substance becomes Hegel’s Absolute Idea – the single entity which is realized in and through the attributes of nature, spirit, art and history. Hegel has his own version of the theory of adequate ideas in writing of the progress of consciousness to freedom to achieve an ‘absolute’ conception of the world. Spinoza’s theory of conatus finds its parallel in Hegel’s doctrine of ‘self-realisation’ which is achieved through the successive ‘objectifications’ of the spirit; the achievement of a political order in Spinoza becomes Hegel’s conception of the state as an ethical agency, as the realisation of freedom. What is original in Hegel is his recovery of a role for subjectivity and the self, consciousness. And from there, we go to Marx …
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